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INTRODUCTION
During the oral arguments in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
Justice Sonia Sotomayor commented that it would seem as if the Supreme
Court had "imbued a creature of State law," the corporation, "with human
characteristics."' In Citizens United, the Court ruled that the First Amend-
ment prohibited restrictions on political speech of corporations. 2 Like no
other prior decision, Citizens United elevated the importance of the question
whether corporations and other types of organizations can assert constitu-
tional rights. That was until the Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., in which three for-profit closely held corporations challenged
contraceptive coverage under the Affordable Care Act of 2010.3 In Hobby
Lobby, at oral arguments, Justice Kennedy posited: "You say profit corpora-
tions just don't have any standing to vindicate the religious rights of their
shareholders and owners. '4 Yet in its decision, the Court did not address the
standing requirements directly, stating that because corporations protect
those "associated with a corporation in one way or another," a for-profit firm
can assert free exercise rights and can itself claim to have sincere "religious
beliefs."5
Are corporations "persons" with standing to assert constitutional rights?
The Court in Citizens United gingerly avoided addressing the issue directly;
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010) (No. 08-205).
2 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010).
3 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
4 Transcript of Oral Argument at 75, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354).
5 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768, 2774, 2779.
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and in Hobby Lobby, the Court avoided the First Amendment issue, relying
instead on statutory rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 while evading the question of corporate standing. As I will explore in
this Article, real missteps in both decisions could have been avoided by
directly addressing these questions. Corporations and other types of
organizations have long exercised a range of constitutional rights, including
those found under the Contracts Clause, 6 Due Process Clause,7 Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause,8 First Amendment, 9 Fourth Amend-
ment,"0 Fifth Amendment Takings and Double Jeopardy Clauses," Sixth
Amendment, 2 and Seventh Amendment.
3
Corporate constitutional litigation is pervasive. While perhaps the most
significant, Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are by no means the only recent
high-profile constitutional cases involving corporate litigants. Take a few
prominent examples: (1) shareholders of AIG filed two derivative actions
claiming that during the global financial crisis, the government's bailout of
AIG was a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment; 14 (2) the Southern
Union Corporation successfully won a Supreme Court victory asserting its
Sixth Amendment right to have aggravating facts proven to a jury when
prosecuted for environmental crimes; s and (3) the Court held that the
Goodyear Dunlop Corporation's subsidiaries in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg
6 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 638-39 (18i9) (finding
that state law unconstitutionally interfered with an organization's contractual rights).
7 See Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889) (recognizing cor-
porations receive protection for the "enjoyment of property," including the ability to challenge
"legislation injuriously affecting it").
8 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985) (citing the "well established"
Equal Protection Clause rights of corporations); Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S.
394, 396 (1886) (noting that the Court agreed that the Equal Protection Clause applied to
corporations at issue).
9 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 ("[T]he First Amendment does not allow political
speech restrictions based on a speaker's corporate identity.").
10 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (declaring a statute unconstitutional
because it violated the corporation's Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless search).
11 See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977) (assuming corpora-
tions are protected by Double Jeopardy Clause rights); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States,
282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (discussing the Takings Clause as applied to a foreign corporation).
12 See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2351-52 (2012) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment can protect a corporation from criminal fines).
13 See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970) (holding that in a derivative shareholder
action, shareholders possess the same right to trial by jury as a corporation).
14 See Starr Int'l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 9o6 F. Supp. 2d 202, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(dismissing complaint except for the takings claim, which was withdrawn); Starr Int'l Co. v.
United States, io6 Fed. Cl. 5O, 71 (2012) (finding plaintiffs stated a certain Fifth Amendment
takings claim).
15 See S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2354, 2357.
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were not "essentially at home" in North Carolina under its Due Process
Clause test for general jurisdiction. 16 Those constitutional claims have little
in common with each other, but just those examples indicate the sheer
breadth and importance of corporate constitutional litigation.
Responding to the long list of corporate constitutional rights the
Supreme Court has already recognized, Justice Stevens went one step
further in his Citizens United dissent to note "[u]nder the majority's view, I
suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that corporations are not
permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other things, a form of
speech."17 Justice Stevens suggested, no doubt tongue in cheek, that having
recognized First Amendment rights, the Court would be obligated for the
sake of consistency to extend all other constitutional rights to corporations.
The Court has not extended all constitutional rights to corporations or to
organizations more generally, such as associations, partnerships, and limited
liability companies. Corporations cannot vote, and the Court has ruled that
they are not citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 8 Corporations lack
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights, 19 Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause rights,20 and Due Process Clause liberty rights.21 Some
constitutional rights are individual-centered and not plausible as rights of
corporations. Unsurprisingly, courts have not recognized a right of corpora-
tions to serve on juries, run for public office, marry, procreate, or travel.
What theory explains why corporations have some constitutional rights
and not others? The Supreme Court has not offered a general theory. The
closest the Court has come to touching the third rail of this jurisprudence
was to suggest that certain "purely personal" constitutional rights cannot be
exercised by corporations.22 Even when the Court recognizes that a corpora-
tion does enjoy a constitutional right, it generally does so without discus-
sion. In Citizens United, for example, the Court did not discuss whether a
corporation is a pure creature of state law, as Justice Sotomayor suggested; a
16 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
17 Citizens United, 13o S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869) ("The term citizens [in the Four-
teenth Amendment] applies only to natural persons.... not to artificial persons created by the
legislature .... ).
19 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (19o6) ("While an individual may lawfully refuse to
answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a
corporation ... may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.").
20 See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839) (remarking that corporations
cannot claim "the rights which belong to its members as citizens of a state").
21 See Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (19o6) ("The liberty referred to in
[the Fourteenth Amendment] is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons.").
22 See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.i4 (1978).
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"real entity" that can exercise all or most of the legal rights of an individual
person; or an aggregate entity that helps groups of people realize their
interests. The Court noted the difficulty in categorizing firms, which range
from media companies to small closely held corporations to large public
companies, and recognized that they exist for a wide range of purposes. In
Hobby Lobby, the majority called it "quite beside the point" that the plain-
tiffs were for-profit organizations incorporated separately from their
owners, blithely offering that without the action of human beings, a corpo-
ration "cannot do anything at all."2
3
Legal scholars have long found the Supreme Court's lack of a coherent
approach or engagement with theoretical questions concerning the nature of
the firm deeply disturbing, calling the Court's rulings "ad hoc," "right-by-
right," "arbitrary" "sporadic," inconsistent, and incoherent. 24 Scholarly
objections to the Court's rulings concerning corporate constitutional rights
have only increased post-Citizens United.25
23 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
24 See, e.g., Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-
Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 399 (20o6) (describing a "right-by-right" approach);
Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate "Person": A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of
Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005) (calling the Court's approach "ad
hoc" and "arbitrary," "fundamentally flawed," and inconsistent even within the same constitutional
amendments); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 650 (1990) (calling the Court's practical approach to corporate rights
"Constitutional Operationalism"); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations
Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67
GEO. L.J. 1347, 1347-48 (1979) (calling the Court's approach "sporadic" and noting "the artificial
nature of a corporation is an inherent source of difficulty in developing an all-encompassing
rationale"); Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (1999)
("[E]lection law has not settled on a single, coherent conception of the corporation-what it is,
what values it serves, and what role it should play in politics."); Michael D. Rivard, Comment,
Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for
Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1465 (1992) (finding that the Court's
pragmatic approach to corporate rights has left the jurisprudence "fragmentary, conclusory, and
contradictory").
25 See, e.g., Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court as Prometheus: Breathing
Life into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 517 (2012) (arguing that Citizens United
characterized corporations as disadvantaged persons by upholding corporate freedom of speech
against government intrusion). It is a separate question-one whose importance I do not want to
minimize, although it is not the subject of this Article-whether the Citizens United decision
"undeniably allows monied special interests to influence both elections and the elected representa-
tives who benefit as a result." Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, lO GEO. L.J. 113,
151 (2012); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 931 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("The Court's ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the
Nation."); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, lo9 MICH. L. REV. 581,
583 (2011) (remarking that Citizens United has left incoherence in the Court's campaign finance
jurisprudence); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 999 (2011) (discussing Justice Steven's vigorous dissent in Citizens
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In this Article, I part company with the many cogent critics of the
Supreme Court's rulings, but also with those who conversely argue that in
Citizens United (and perhaps now in Hobby Lobby), the Court has finally
recognized corporations as "real entit[ies]." 26 The Court adopts a consistent
approach, but the approach proceeds right-by-right, rather than by starting
with a theory of organizations or corporations as constitutional actors.
When the Court embarked on the project of incorporating the Bill of
Rights against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as I describe
in Part I of this Article, it ultimately rejected the "total incorporation"
approach championed by Justice Black in favor of a "selective incorporation"
approach-considering rights one at a time and asking whether each should
apply to state actors. 27 What do the great incorporation debates tell us about
the subject of constitutional rights of corporations? Critically, the Court
refused to alter the substantive content of any Bill of Rights provision when
extending it to the states; each right must "be enforced ... according to the
same standards. '28
Similarly, as I detail in Part II, the Supreme Court has not extended the
entire Bill of Rights to corporations. The Court has adopted a selective
approach from the early Marshall Court rulings to Citizens United. One
could imagine that each right might apply in different ways to individuals
and organizations, or apply to only some types of organizations. Instead, the
Court keeps constant the substantive content of rights when litigated by
organizations. The Court largely avoids organizational theory and focuses
on constitutional theory.29
United); Ronald Dworkin, The "Devastating" Decision, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2olo, at 65
(arguing that Citizens United is incorrect because corporations should not be afforded First
Amendment protections). But see Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity:
Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 643, 646 (2011) ("Citizens
United is unlikely to 'unleash' corporate campaign spending since corporate spending was not
really leashed by the law prior to the decision."). In addressing this question, Ashutosh Bhagwat
points to the difference between organizational and associational speakers. See Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 1024 (2011) ("The key issue is not the corporate form of the
speaker but what kind of collective entity-that is to say, association-the speaker is.").
26 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV.
999, 1043.
27 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
28 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, iO-l1 ( 964) (rejecting "the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048 (2010) ("The relationship between the Bill of Rights' guarantees
and the States must be governed by a single, neutral principle.").
29 For views sympathetic with those described here, treating corporations as convenient
litigation units, see Burt Neuborne, Of "Singles" Without Baseball: Corporations as Frozen Relational
Moments, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 769, 771 (2012) (arguing that "the judiciary's approach to corporate
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The Supreme Court's approach should be grounded in the doctrine of
standing, a body of law flowing from the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article III, which vests the federal judiciary with the "Power" to decide
"Cases" and "Controversies."30 The Court has defined the general test for
standing as a question whether the organization itself can claim a "concrete
injury," or an "injury in fact," that is separate from any injury to a third
party.31 The Court has explained that "the injury must affect the plaintiff in
a personal and individual way."3 2 Conceived as a question of standing, rather
than a question of what an organization is and whether it "has" a constitu-
tional right, the analysis is simple: once an organization has Article III
standing to litigate a constitutional question, the merits analysis proceeds as
for an individual litigant.
In Part III, I develop the implications of Article III standing analysis for
constitutional corporate rights. Article III standing doctrine has been
criticized since its inception as a highly malleable set of jurisdictional
barriers contrary to congressional intent and the structure of the modern
regulatory state, contrary to the text and history of Article III, and prone to
particularly controversial and unjustified rulings in cases regarding public
law and civil rights litigants. 33 Without disagreeing with each of those
legal personality" should not "creat[e] a corporate fiction that stands apart from its human
players"). For an analysis of third-party standing of family-owned corporations, see generally
Matthew I. Hall & Benjamin Means, Essay, The Prudential Third-Party Standing of Family-Owned
Corporations, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 151 (2014).
30 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
31 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) ("[A] mere 'interest in a problem,' no
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating
the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved'
within the meaning of the APA."); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56o-61
(1992) (describing the additional "injury in fact" requirements that the injury is imminent, causally
connected to the conduct, and "likely" rather than "speculative"); Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982) ("[O]rganizations are entitled to sue on their own behalf
for injuries they have sustained.").
32 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.
33 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1767 (1999)
("Any claim that the Constitution, the original intent of the Framers, or Anglo-American legal
history and tradition compel modern standing law is undermined by the historical studies of
standing."); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1432, 1466, 148o (1988) (calling the injury-in-fact test "malleable" and the Court's private-law
model one that "would also contradict the text and history of article III, fly in the face of
congressional understandings and expectations, and skew administrative incentives in undesirable
directions"); Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article 111: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1705-o6 (198o) ("Not only do the commentators note such manipulation [of
standing doctrine], but members of the Supreme Court themselves routinely accuse each other of
distorting the doctrine for their own purposes." (footnote omitted)); see also Ann Woolhandler &
Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 712-13 (2004)
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criticisms, some of which I have also levied, the modern body of standing
doctrine provides categories for treatment of organizational litigants. The
Supreme Court has set out two doctrines of Article III standing-
associational and organizational standing-that, together with the pruden-
tial doctrine of third-party standing, explain when and whether entities can
litigate constitutional rights. Corporations are separate legal entities that
have standing to assert rights on behalf of the entity itself. Tracking the
organizational standing test, a court is most likely to view corporations as
having Article III standing to assert a constitutional right when that right
relates to the economic interests. In contrast, associations and religious
organizations have broad standing to litigate injuries of their members. The
Court has also set out related prudential standing doctrines that sharply
limit the ability of third parties to assert rights on behalf of another. Thus
shareholders can only assert rights derivatively in the name of the corpora-
tion, and conversely, the corporation cannot litigate the separate rights of
shareholders or other constituents, like officers or employees. 34 Those
Article III tests, I argue, best explain the existing doctrine, even if some of
the earlier decisions predated the Court's modern Article III decisions and
do not frame their reasoning in Article III terms.
This approach toward corporate constitutional standing is normatively
preferable, and I sharply criticize the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby
Lobby for not only ignoring Article III and prudential third-party standing
entirely but also for using casual language in the opinion that suggests that
even outside the context of a closely held family-owned corporation, the
distinctions between associations, religious organizations, and for-profit
corporations simply do not matter to the analysis. Separating the question
of Article III standing from the merits importantly avoids advisory opinions
on constitutional claims, and such caution is particularly warranted when an
entity seeks to litigate a constitutional right. One person does not normally
have standing to assert the liberty interest of another. Why a corporation
can assert the religious beliefs of its owners is a puzzle not clearly answered
in Hobby Lobby. A careful Article III standing analysis could have more
narrowly (if not defensibly) explained the result in the case, if limited to the
(responding that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the concern with "private right[s]"
and the public-private distinction was observed). I have previously critically analyzed the standing
analysis in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights,
88 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 593, 634 (2012).
34 I describe those standards in Part III infra. For a concise statement of the basic rule, see,
for example, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982), where the Court
declared that "organizations are entitled to sue on their own behalf for injuries they have
sustained."
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circumstances of a closely held family-owned corporation and if the owners
did not themselves have standing to sue. That the Court did not engage in
any such analysis not only adds fuel to the criticism of its free exercise and
corporate constitutional rights jurisprudence but also to the malleability of
its Article III jurisprudence.
As Justice Frankfurter famously remarked, "The history of American
constitutional law in no small measure is the history of the impact of the
modern corporation upon the American scene. s35 Corporate litigation has
long reshaped the content of constitutional rights, from the Lochner era to
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Where the corporation is the
litigant, one may ask different constitutional questions, examine different
facts, and perhaps reach different answers. Understanding the contours of
the approach across different areas, from civil procedure to criminal proce-
dure to speech, can help us understand the future direction of corporate
constitutional litigation. I describe in Part IV how several key rulings by the
Court, in part due to developments in underlying substantive law, now
stand on thinner ice.
Finally, I conclude by exploring how the treatment of corporate consti-
tutional standing helps illuminate something double-edged about constitu-
tional rights more generally: few are framed as purely "individual" rights.
Constitutional rights are framed generally, often imposing limitations on
the government or recognizing general privileges or immunities, but not by
creating individual-specific tests. Moreover, some of the most effective
constitutional rights may be precisely those not limited by individual
circumstances, and therefore readily exercised by organizations. At the same
time, however, such rights may poorly protect individual dignitary interests.
Individuals have long sought protection by seeking to have associations
litigate to challenge constitutional violations. However, litigation by
organizations can also conflict with individual interests and undermine
individual rights. The Hobby Lobby decision contains dicta suggesting that
courts need not adhere to well-established categories of Article III standing,
opening the door to all manner of ill-advised corporate standing. That
specter provides all the more reason to scrutinize corporate assertions of
constitutional standing carefully if and when corporations act at the expense
of individual rights.
35 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND
WAITE 63 (1937).
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I. SELECTIVE INCORPORATION OF CORPORATE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The debates over total and selective incorporation raged through the
196os, and they occasionally resurface when the Supreme Court considers
whether to incorporate-that is, to make applicable against the states-one
of the lingering constitutional rights not already incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause during the heyday of incorpo-
ration. Debates over the proper scope of incorporation returned, for example,
when the Court incorporated the Second Amendment right to bear arms
against the states in McDonald v. City of Chicago.36 Those debates focused on
whether the operation and substance of constitutional provisions should be
operationalized as against state actors. Although ultimately incorporating
most of the Bill of Rights against the states, the Court asks whether a
particular right is "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system
of justice. '37 Without making too much of the comparison, there are useful
parallels to the more gradual process of recognizing-and sometimes not
recognizing-corporate constitutional rights.
Most relevant is the way selective incorporation treats the underlying
constitutional rights. When deciding to selectively incorporate the Bill of
Rights as against the States, the Supreme Court refused to alter the substan-
tive content of any Bill of Rights provision when it extended the rights to the
States; the rights must all "be enforced against the States under the Four-
teenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those
personal rights against federal encroachment." 3 I argue that the Court has
done the same across a wide range of constitutional rights as applied to
corporations.
Just as incorporating much of the Bill of Rights as against the states has
reshaped constitutional litigation, permitting corporations and organizations
to litigate constitutional rights has had dramatic consequences. That is the
limit of the comparison. The question is whether organizations may possess
constitutional protections and, if so, which ones. While the due process
principle of "ordered liberty" provided a test to decide whether rights apply
as against the states, that principle would not work to decide if corporations
have constitutional rights. A different principle is required, and I develop in
Part II how Article III standing requirements provide that general principle.
36 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
37 Id. at 3034.
38 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, lo (1964).
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A. To Whom Do Constitutional Rights Attach?
Asking whether a corporation itself has standing to litigate a constitu-
tional right in federal court is a question that implicates the underlying legal
status of the corporation and the interests accompanying it. State law
defines the status of an incorporated or other form of business entity.39
State or federal law may provide a natural person with some type of legal
status like citizenship, domicile, or marriage. State law defines the organiza-
tional requirements for being recognized as a type of corporation or part-
nership, as well as the legal consequences of such status. 40 A corporation
may have a very large group of shareholders and separate management if it
is a public corporation with stock that is listed, or it may be a very large
corporation with private owners. A corporation may have a small group of
members (or not, if it is a sole proprietorship); in fact, the vast majority of
corporations are quite small. 41 Other organizations include partnerships,
owned by a group, and limited liability corporations (LLCs). LLCs are
simple to create, like partnerships, but enjoy limited liability like corpora-
tions.42 Since a corporation is a creature of state law, federal courts may be
leery of interfering with the definition of its legal status under state law.43
In contrast, federal courts play an important role in defining status relating
to citizenship and immigration, which are defined by the Fourteenth
Amendment and federal law. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
citizenship rights, making such questions of federal and constitutional
concern. For example, the right to vote is "a citizen's right to vote."44 Legal
permanent residents and other gradations of immigration status may bring
with them intermediate forms of constitutional protection. 4 Juveniles do
39 See Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. so6i, 1o64 (1994) (defining a corporation as "an artificial legal person created by state
law").
40 See id. (noting that a "corporation derives its being by concession from the State").
41 See Statistics About Business Size (Including Small Business)from the US. Census Bureau, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (2007), http:/lwww.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
5 MZ-9AHC (providing data on average business sizes).
42 See generally Daniel M. Hiusermann, For a Few Dollars Less: Explaining State to State Varia-
tion in Limited Liability Company Popularity, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (describing the
mechanics of various business organization forms).
43 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775 (discussing how courts will "turn to" the "underlying
state" corporate law when "resolving disputes").
44 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
45 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1982) (holding that noncitizens that illegally
entered the United States are protected by the Equal Protection Clause); Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 59 o , 6ol (1953) ("While it may be that a resident alien's ultimate right to remain
in the United States is subject to alteration by statute or authorized regulation ... , it does not
follow that he is thereby deprived of his constitutional right to procedural due process."). But see
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not enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults, although they will with
age become full rights-bearing citizens. 46 Criminal convictions may cause
citizens to lose the right to vote or serve on juries, and prisoners may have
altered constitutional rights as well.4 7 Those questions about altered consti-
tutional rights as connected to citizenship status do not affect domestic
corporations (though perhaps they could affect foreign corporations)
because corporations are not citizens, as the Supreme Court has held since
Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux.48 As a result, as Amy J. Sepinwall puts it, "[c]orporations, it goes
without saying, are neither expected nor entitled to vote, perform jury duty,
or serve in the military."49
That said, in other contexts in which state law defines legal status, the
Court has set out constitutional limits on the degree to which a state may
limit access to that status or burden it. For example, the Court has recog-
nized a fundamental right to access to marriage.50 The Court has recognized
certain rights of parents, including that parents may constitutionally
challenge state decisions to remove children from their custody, while non-
parents do not enjoy the same constitutional rights to seek custody of a
child. 51 A married couple may enjoy joint rights as well as obligations of the
marital status. A state adoption judgment may create parental status.12 Nor
is there anything unusual about shared property interests, or multiple
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (concluding that noncitizens with no
"substantial connections" to the United States lack Fourth Amendment protection).
46 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("[Jjuvenile offenders constitutionally
may be treated differently from adults."); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 74 (1976) (recognizing that although everyone is entitled to constitutional rights, states
generally have more power to regulate activities of children).
47 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (holding that a prisoner "retains those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system").
48 9 U.S. (S Cranch) 61, 86 (18o9).
49 Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate Citizenship, 44
CONN. L. REV. 575, 604 (2012).
50 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of
man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival.").
51 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State.").
52 See Pamela K. Terry, E Pluribus Unum? The Full Faith and Credit Clause and Meaningful
Recognition of Out-of-State Adoptions, 8o FORDHAM L. REV. 3093, 3113 (2012) ("Although an agency
or individuals may now 'arrange' an adoption, the legal relationship of parent and child cannot be
created without a judicial decree." (footnote omitted)).
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people bringing legal actions asserting shared or competing property
interests."3
In Levy v. Louisiana, making the connection between corporate persons
and cases regarding the status of individuals, Justice Douglas famously
wrote that illegitimate children are persons, rhetorically asking: "would a
corporation, which is a 'person' ... be required to forgo recovery for wrongs
done its interests because its incorporators were all bastards?"5 4 As with
other forms of legal status, the corporation includes a defined bundle of
legal rights and obligations. Although those rights are defined by state law, a
state may violate the constitutional rights of a corporate "person" by
unconstitutionally limiting access to those goods. As I will explain, however,
calling corporations "persons" may not be a helpful usage. I argue that
corporations litigate constitutional rights because they have standing to
litigate an injury to the entity and associations have standing to litigate on
behalf of their members, while organizations generally lack standing to
litigate on behalf of other constituents such as employees and officers.
B. Theories of Corporate Personhood
There is no one single approach to constitutional personhood of corpo-
rations. Nor is there a single theory that enjoys universal acceptance of what
kind of person or entity a corporation or organization is. Early Supreme
Court cases, discussed in sections that follow, placed some emphasis on the
"artificial" nature of firms as fictional legal creations. Chief Justice John
Marshall, for example, famously called a corporation "an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."5 5 However,
far from characterizing a corporation as a mere legal fiction, Chief Justice
Marshall also placed great emphasis on the remarkable ability of corpora-
tions to realize the "charitable or other useful" and "beneficial" goals of their
creators.5 6 Relatedly, as at common law, early courts emphasized the "grant"
or "concession" theory, recognizing that corporations owe their existence to
the state, and therefore serve at the pleasure of the state.5 7 Other courts and
53 See, e.g., 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 38 (2014) (noting that in a declaratory judgment
action, "[any person having an interest under a ... legal instrument, or whose rights, status, or
other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have
determined any question of construction or validity ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status,
or other legal relations thereunder").
54 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
55 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
56 Id. at 637-38.
57 See Phillips, supra note 39, at io64-65 (noting that a "corporation derives its being by con-
cession from the State").
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commentators have long viewed such entities as "aggregate" in nature, since
they involve groups of people who contract together, and some, like partner-
ships, are governed by a group of owners.5 8 By the turn of the twentieth
century, courts and commentators increasingly emphasized that corpora-
tions should be treated as "real" or independent legal persons with some of
the same rights as natural persons, but separate and distinct from their
members. 59
The selective incorporation approach adopted by the Court avoided
questions relating to the nature of states as sovereigns and whether constitu-
tional rights apply differently to the states. Instead, the approach focused on
whether each right was so important that it deserved protection from
violation by state actors.60 The approach toward constitutional rights of
corporations has some parallels.
Some have argued that the Court should start by defining what a corpo-
ration or organization is and then build a theory of constitutional rights
from that underlying definition. Does it take a theory of corporate constitu-
tional rights? For example, Carl Mayer has argued that "[a]fter 196o, the
Court abandoned theorizing about corporate personhood. ' '61 I am not
convinced the Court was in that business either before or after 196o. To be
sure, theorists in corporate law, corporate governance, philosophy, and
organizational behavior have debated for over a century how best to define a
corporation. Corporations and other organizations each have a complex
range of legal duties and rights under the statutes, procedures, and case law
regulating their creation. It is difficult and perhaps unnecessary to decide
which are most salient. Different characteristics are salient for different
purposes. For constitutional purposes, different characteristics may be
salient depending upon the constitutional right in question.
58 As I will discuss, I view modern corporations and limited liability corporations, though not
consisting of equal partners, as forms of aggregate or group governance. There are questions
regarding which individuals are to be considered part of the aggregate entity. For example, one
may consider whether shareholders, directors, officers, and employees should also be viewed as
part of the entity. See Phillips, supra note 39, at 1O65-67 (describing various aggregate entity
theories and their inclusion of different players in the corporate structure).
59 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1507-08 (1989) (exploring the changing views of corporations
during this period); Phillips, supra note 39, at io64-70 (setting forth three conceptions of a
corporation that competed for acceptance from the 189os to the 193os).
60 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010) (noting that selective
incorporation first requires an examination of whether the "particular Bill of Rights guarantee is
fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice").
61 Mayer, supra note 24, at 620.
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The idea that corporations may exercise constitutional rights is nothing
new. The Supreme Court has struggled with the constitutional status of
corporations since the Marshall Court. Corporate personhood itself evolved
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a complex and
powerful legal concept. Yet neither judges nor scholars during this period
could reconcile whether corporations were simply legal creations, "persons"
with real rights, aggregations that protected rights of their individual
members and shareholders, or some combination of those ideas.62 While
debates about the nature of the firm raged for decades in the early twentieth
century, those debates eventually cooled.
One reason may have been the intervention of pragmatists, or legal real-
ists, who were unconcerned with whether there was any true "essence" of
what a corporation is. Most famously, perhaps, John Dewey, the pragmatist
philosopher, wrote in 1926 that we should be "eliminating the idea of
personality until the concrete facts and relations involved have been faced
and stated on their own account: retaining the word will then do no great
harm."63 Accompanying (or even driving) this change in outlook was an
increasingly national and international economic interconnectedness, along
with the rise of the modern regulatory state, which together caused corpora-
tions and business organizations to be viewed quite differently. Far more
typical of the Supreme Court's "realist" view of the status of corporations
was language in the famous International Shoe decision regarding personal
jurisdiction, which notably did not dwell on the formal status of incorpora-
tion, "[s]ince the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction
intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact." 64 Instead, the Court
focused its due process analysis on the "activities" and "contacts" of a
corporation with a state, whether "it enjoys the benefits and protection of
the laws of that state," and whether jurisdiction over such business activity
is "reasonable."65 Avoiding questions whether a corporation is a "real" or an
"artificial" legal creation, an aggregate, or some of each, the question the
62 See Bratton, supra note 59, at 1484 (advancing the various theories for how to conceive of
corporations); Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1445 (1987) (noting that "[s]everal conceptions of the
corporation were available to theorists and policy makers" in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries).
63 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 673 (1926).
64 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
65 Id. at 317-19. For an argument that the status of a corporation as a network of underlying
contracts, as opposed to a legal entity, supports constitutional rights of corporations, see Larry E.
Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95 (1995).
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Court addressed was how law should regulate the entity and what practical
effects follow.
Some critics of the Court's approach in such rulings, who wish that the
Court would directly engage more in questions of theory of the firm, do
concede, as Carl Mayer does, that "[t]he Court is on much safer ground
looking to the purpose of the first, fourth, or fifth amendments than
attempting to define the relationship of corporations to the state."66 A
"pragmatic methodology" does not, as Mayer argues, obscure an "antecedent,
and theoretical, question of what is the nature and purpose of a corpora-
tion."67 Such methodology avoids that question because it is not properly a
constitutional question, but instead one defined by state law. Now, there
may be different types of questions in the context of a particular constitu-
tional right whether the Court has sufficiently avoided intervening in
questions of corporate governance or instead alters the constitutional
analysis. As Justice Rehnquist explained:
Extension of the individual freedom of conscience decisions to business
corporations strains the rationale of those cases beyond the breaking point.
To ascribe to such artificial entities an 'intellect' or 'mind' for freedom of
conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality .... The insistence
on treating identically for constitutional purposes entities that are demon-
strably different is as great a jurisprudential sin as treating differently those
entities which are the same.68
Whether or not organizations and business corporations can be conceived as
possessing individual freedom of conscience or liberty rights, it is a separate
question whether they can effectively litigate those issues on behalf of
individuals.
II. A TAXONOMY OF CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In this Part, I argue that for each constitutional right the Supreme Court
has considered, the Court has adopted a consistent approach by largely
avoiding questions concerning the inherent nature of different types of
entities. Instead, the Court focuses on the consequences of finding that an
organization has standing to assert the right by examining the purposes of
66 Mayer, supra note 24, at 646. However, he then argues that the Court "engages in Consti-
tutional Operationalism by suggesting that a corporation is only entitled to the guarantees of a
certain amendment if, by so awarding the protection, the amendment's purposes are furthered." Id.
at 650.
67 See id.
68 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 33, 35 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the particular constitutional right to decide if entities have asserted a
sufficient injury creating standing to litigate the right. I will describe how
the Court and lower courts have grappled with whether, and under what
circumstances, a wide range of constitutional rights can attach to organizations.
A. The Contract Clause
What did the Framers think about corporations? Perhaps not much. The
word corporation does not appear in the Constitution. 69 Justice Scalia has
argued corporations were familiar as a part of economic life by the time of
the founding and that much of the disapproval of state-chartered corpora-
tions related to grants of monopolies and special privileges, which would
not apply to generally chartered modern corporations.7" To be sure, as
Justice Brandeis put it, "at first, the corporate privilege was granted sparingly;
and only when the grant seemed necessary in order to procure for the
community some specific benefit otherwise unattainable. '71
Early Supreme Court rulings dealt with the Bank of the United States,
highly controversial in both of its incarnations, and also less controversial
corporations for the time, including charitable organizations such as univer-
sities. In Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, the Supreme Court called
corporations "a mere creature of the law, invisible, intangible, and incorpo-
real. ' 72 Yet the Court treated them as "citizens" for diversity under Article
III, since "corporations have been included within terms of description
appropriated to real persons."7 The Court recognized that there was no
reason not to give corporations legal standing to litigate in federal court.
In a far more significant ruling, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward how the Contract Clause of the Constitu-
tion protects corporate charters from alteration by state legislation.74 Chief
69 Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a "Real" Constitutional Person, ii U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 221, 232 (2011).
70 Citizens United, 13o S. Ct.at 926 (Scalia, J., concurring).
71 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
72 9 U.S. (S Cranch) 61, 86 (18o9).
73 Id. at 88. However, the Court did so by asking that courts "look to the character of the
individuals who compose [it]." Id. at 91-92. Adopting a different approach, the Court in Louisville,
Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson, held that a corporation is "capable of being treated as
a citizen of [the state which created it], as much as a natural person." 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, S58
(1844). The Court has declined to extend similar treatment, however, to a partnership. See, e.g.,
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 18S, 192 (199o) (holding that the citizenship of both general
and limited partners controls the question of diversity); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177
U.S. 449, 454 (19oo) (refusing to treat a limited partnership association as a corporation for
purposes ofjurisdiction).
74 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) S18, 630 (1819).
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Justice Marshall emphasized that corporations were an "artificial being" that
existed "only in contemplation of law.""5 That language regarding artificiality
is often taken out of context to suggest that the Court adopted an "artificial
entity" view that corporations exist only as creatures of law. However, the
word artificial did not necessarily have a negative connotation at the time:
human artifice and creativity was something to be admired.7 6 Indeed, much
of the language of the opinion went on to say that corporations are designed
for the "beneficial" purposes of holding and protecting the private property
of individual people. Chief Justice Marshall celebrated the importance of
this human creation as a means to accomplish charitable and educational
goals that could not be attained otherwise.7 7 Corporations may be created by
law, but they accomplish important goals of individuals, such as protecting
property and furthering the public good. The reasoning was consequentialist
and pragmatic, and it set the tone for the Court's jurisprudence that
followed.
B. The Equal Protection Clause
Following Reconstruction, the Court held that corporations are not citi-
zens under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.78 In contrast, in 1886, the Court noted that it did not wish to
hear argument in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. on the
question whether corporations were protected by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since the Justices "[we]re all of
opinion that it does."79 That statement has been reaffirmed in a series of
opinions since, such that the Court in 1985 called the principle that corpora-
tions have Equal Protection Clause rights "well established."80 The view was
75 Id. at 636.
76 1 am grateful to John O'Brien for making this important point.
77 See Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 638 (describing the various benefits that corporations
confer upon the public).
78 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869) ("The term citizens [as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment] applies only to natural persons,... not to artificial persons created by
the legislature .... ). The Court had earlier reached the same conclusion as to the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clauses. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, S86-87
(1839).
79 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
80 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985); S. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216
U.S. 400, 412 (191o) ("That a corporation is a person, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is no longer open to discussion."); see also Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited:
The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 177-78 (1985) (explaining the context
leading up to the Santa Clara decision). But see Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562,
576-77 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]here was no history, logic, or reason given
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that corporations exist to protect the property interests of their owners and
can therefore assert those interests in litigation.81
C. The Due Process Clause
The conventional understanding of the due process rights of corpora-
tions is compatible with corporations litigating these rights-at least in
regard to property rights and not liberty rights. The Court held early on, in
19o6, that corporations may not litigate liberty rights under the Due Process
Clause because it protects "the liberty of natural, not artificial persons."
8 2
Corporations have exercised due process rights regarding property, how-
ever, for over a century. In the 1893 Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad Co.
decision, the Court first extended due process protections to a corpora-
tion.8 The Due Process Clause would come into its own in the Lochner era,
deployed by corporations to challenge regulations.8 4 Those substantive
rulings were quite controversial. They permitted corporations to overturn
regulations with public interest goals, and the Court would ultimately
reconsider that substantive due process jurisprudence. That a corporation
had standing to raise attacks on statutes in litigation itself was not contro-
versial; instead, it was the way that the Court interpreted the Due Process
Clause to protect corporate freedom to contract. Corporate standing to
challenge regulations should not be controversial. If corporations could not
do so, then regulations chiefly intended to regulate corporations could be
drafted in arbitrary ways. Corporations and other business entities are the
logical entities to have standing to litigate such issues.
The Due Process Clause also regulates personal jurisdiction. That area
provides the most difficult questions concerning "where" a corporation is
and where it is "at home." s Corporations are frequent litigants and fre-
quently on the receiving end of litigation. Federal judges have no choice but
[in Santa Clara] to support [the] view"); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85
(1938) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe the word 'person' in the Fourteenth Amendment
includes corporations.").
81 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J.
1593, 1649 (1988) (concluding "the corporate personhood doctrine of Santa Clara represented an
efficient way for the corporation to assert the property rights of its shareholders").
82 Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (19o6).
83 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893).
84 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278 (1932) ("Plainly, a regulation
which has the effect of denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in a lawful
private business ... cannot be upheld consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.").
85 See generally Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of "Essentially at Home" in Goodyear Dunlop, 63
S.C. L. REV. 527 (2012) (citing challenges inherent in deciding where a corporation is "essentially
at home").
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to conceptualize a corporation and its litigation expectations when deciding
whether and when it is appropriate to find personal jurisdiction over a
corporation. Rather than limit litigation against corporations to the state in
which they are domiciled or have their principal place of business, federal
judges focus more broadly on what "minimum contacts" and "purposeful
availment" a business has with another state, together with other features of
those contacts, including the reasonableness of the jurisdiction, the benefits
the corporation receives from business in the state, the burdens and incon-
venience of litigation in the state, and the foreseeability of litigation in the
state.86
A corporation may be sued for all purposes, under the due process heading
of "general jurisdiction," in limited circumstances, even outside of its state
of incorporation. General jurisdiction is a concept that does not arise for
individuals, who can be domiciled in at most one state, but it does for
artificial entities that may be "present" in multiple states.87 Although this
corner of the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has garnered attention in
recent Supreme Court interventions regarding when a corporation has so
much continuous contact so as to be "essentially at home" in a state and
subject to suit for activities unrelated to those in-state,88 courts have rarely
needed to rule on general jurisdiction over corporations. After all, the
modern personal jurisdiction test is so broad that specific jurisdiction is
usually straightforward to obtain. Corporations with broad business dealings
can use contractual forum selection clauses to minimize inconvenience of
litigation, while states can make consent to jurisdiction a condition of
incorporation.8 9 It was modern commerce that caused the Supreme Court to
modernize the personal jurisdiction test and adopt the "minimum contacts"
framework for individuals and corporations alike.
The Supreme Court has also long allowed corporations to challenge
criminal statutes. Since a corporation may be prosecuted for the acts of its
employees, it should be able to assert due process objections to a criminal
86 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1945) (discussing each of these
factors).
87 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) ("A
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to
hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and
systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.").
88 See, e.g., id. at 2850; J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011)
(plurality opinion) (referring to general jurisdiction as perhaps limited to the state of "incorpora-
tion or principal place of business for corporations").
89 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (upholding a forum
selection clause contained within a ticket-purchase contract).
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statute as a defense to its prosecution.9" Landmark criminal procedure
rulings by the Court have occurred in cases brought by corporations as
litigants. The issues in those cases may be little different than if an individual
had challenged the statute, although corporations may have more resources
to mount costly appellate litigation. In doing so, corporations may create
important precedent for individual defendants as well.
D. The First Amendment
The constitutional rights of corporate persons have become a subject of
popular and political debate in the wake of the Supreme Court's 2010
decision in Citizens United. There, the Court ruled in favor of a nonprofit
corporation that brought a challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA), which had barred corporations and unions from
making direct contributions or from using independent expenditures for
"electioneering communication" or speech expressly advocating election or
defeat of a political candidate. 91 As Robert Sprague and Mary Ellen Wells
put it: "To say that Citizens United's holding is controversial is an under-
statement. '92 This Section tackles why I think some of the conventional
understanding of Citizens United is wrong.
Some argue that Citizens United changed the entire map of corporate
constitutional rights. They view the case as creating a presumption in favor
of corporations possessing all constitutional rights, even liberty-oriented
speech rights. 93 I disagree with such characterizations of the ruling. The
Court's ruling may very well have a dramatic impact on elections, and it
may be wrong as a matter of policy, and even as a matter of First Amend-
ment interpretation. What the Court did not do, however, was depart from
its prior rulings regarding whether organizations have constitutional rights.
Indeed, neither the majority nor the dissent questioned that corporations
have First Amendment rights. Where they disagreed was whether a compelling
state interest justified restricting corporate political donations.
90 See, e.g., Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 83-86 (19o8) (considering due
process defense by a corporation charged for violating the Elkins Act).
91 130 S. Ct. at 911 (interpreting 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2012)). Media corporations were
exempted from the BCRA's coverage. See 2 U.S.C. § 4 3 1(9 )(B)(i) (2012). The Court emphasized
that "[t]here is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between corporations
which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are not." Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 905.
92 Sprague & Wells, supra note 25, at 508.
93 See, e.g., Joanna M. Meyer, Note, The Real Error in Citizens United, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 2171, 2187-88 (2012) (suggesting that Citizens United is problematic because it does not
conduct a careful analysis about why a corporation is entitled to First Amendment protection).
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The Court's broader First Amendment jurisprudence helps to explain
why it was not controversial to conclude that corporations have First
Amendment rights, which the Court first recognized in its 1978 First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti decision.94 While critics find it objectionable
that corporations benefit from a right as "personal" as the First Amendment
free speech right, the First Amendment protects "speech" and not persons. 9
In addition, the First Amendment mentions the "press," which some
scholars have argued indicates an understanding of the crucial role that
media organizations play in promoting speech. 96 In First Amendment cases,
the Court is focused on the marketplace of ideas, 97 which then leads to a
broad notion of corporate standing to litigate participation in that market-
place.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the underlying speech protection to
protect speech and not speakers. In Bellotti, the Court noted speech does not
lose First Amendment protection "simply because its source is a corpora-
tion."98 The Court rejected arguments that special dangers of corporate
participation in the political process, or the rights of shareholders that
might disapprove of the corporate speech, were implicated by the particular
statute, and so could not suffice as a compelling state interest to justify
restricting corporate speech. 99
Following that ruling, the Court attempted to fashion a taxonomy of
types of organizations, and in a series of rulings, developed a complex
approach in which regulations could bar some corporate political donations
but not others, depending on the type of corporation or organization. This
approach began in 1982 in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee where
the Court found that a federal campaign statute restricting which persons
could be solicited to contribute to segregated corporate funds "reflect[ed] a
legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure
94 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). The Court did not reach the issue in earlier cases. See, e.g., Pipe-
fitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 399-400 (1972) ("This disposition
makes decision of the constitutional issues premature, and we therefore do not decide them.");
United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 591 (1957) (noting the Court's "[r]efusal to anticipate
constitutional questions").
95 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
96 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 848 (2008)
(discussing the "institutionally aware" First Amendment); Frederick Schauer, Towards an
Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1274 (2005) ("I want to suggest that a certain
number of existing social institutions in general, even if not in every particular, serve functions
that the First Amendment deems especially important ... ").
97 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (framing the protec-
tions of the First Amendment as covering anyone who wishes to enter the "marketplace of ideas").
98 43S U.S. at 784.
99 Id. at 789-92.
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require particularly careful regulation."'00 In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., the Court ruled that a federal statute requiring corporations to
make independent political expenditures only through special segregated
funds, 2 U.S.C. § 4 4 1b, unduly burdened corporate freedom of expression as
applied to a small nonprofit corporation, which would not be able to afford
to comply, in part because it was not a business corporation and did not
accept contributions from business corporations. 0 1 However, the Court
emphasized in contrast that business corporations can use "resources
amassed in the economic marketplace" to obtain "an unfair advantage in the
political marketplace.' 0 2 Further, the Court emphasized corporate resources
"are not an indication of popular support for the corporation's political
ideas; they reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors
and customers."'1 3 Similarly, in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee, the Court recognized a compelling government interest in
"preventing corruption," but in that case struck down a statute as over-
broad. 04
The taxonomy approach, permitting legislation to distinguish types of
organizations and corporations, appeared ascendant. Its apogee was the
Court's 199o ruling, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which followed
those prior decisions to hold that political donations could be limited if the
speaker was an entity, but only depending on the type of company at
issue.' 0 The Austin Court adopted a fine-grained view of how corporations
might be affected by speech-restricting regulations. Although the Michigan
law distinguished between business corporations and unions, the Court
noted that the distinction was appropriate given that federal law limits
political spending by unions to segregated funds raised through voluntary
contributions. 10 6 Similarly, the Court explained that the Michigan statute
could sensibly exclude media corporations, given the "unique role" the press
100 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982).
101 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986).
102 Id. at 257.
103 Id. at 258. For additional discussion of stockholder's rights, see Victor Brudney, Business
Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 247 (1981).
104 470 U.S. 480, 5oo-o1 (1985).
105 494 U.S. 652, 661-62 (1990).
106 See id. at 665-66 ("An employee who objects to a union's political activities thus can
decline to contribute to those activities, while continuing to enjoy the benefits derived from the
union's performance of its duties as the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit on labor-
management issues."). For a criticism of Austin, see Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49
WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1o9, 156 (1992), where the author argues that modern economic theory
undercuts arguments in favor of regulating corporate speech.
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plays in informing the public.10 7 In contrast, business organizations could be
regulated, based on "the compelling state interest of eliminating from the
political process the corrosive effect of political 'war chests' amassed with
the aid of the legal advantages given to corporations." s0 8 The Austin Court
also emphasized that the Michigan statute that limited independent
expenditures supporting candidates affected corporations-but corporations
were themselves a creature of state statutes and derived special advantages
from them. 10 9 (In dissent, Justice Scalia protested that it would be an
unconstitutional condition to limit speech based on granting privileges to
corporations. 110 )
The very provisions challenged in Citizens United had been upheld in the
2003 McConnell v. FEC decision, which noted how the Court had repeatedly
upheld such restrictions on corporate spending."1 Citizens United marked a
sharp break from those earlier decisions. The Court emphasized that despite
not being "natural persons," corporations have First Amendment rights. 112
That part of the ruling should not be controversial. Corporations have long
been held to have various constitutional rights-as well as First Amend-
ment rights.
The change was that the Court rejected the taxonomy-based approach
distinguishing among organizations. The Court abandoned the nuanced
approach involving the application of narrow tailoring and compelling state
interest law that had developed over the prior decades. Under Austin, the
Court might have narrowly ruled that as a nonprofit organization, Citizens
United was the type of entity to which people donate money to promote
their speech, and therefore it should be given an exception from the relevant
provisions 13 It did not matter what kind of corporation Citizens United
was-the Court rejected its earlier "intricate case-by-case determinations"
entirely, electing instead to use a categorical approach finding all such
107 Austin, 494 U.S. at 667.
108 Id. at 666.
109 See id. at 658-59 (highlighting some of the advantages conferred upon corporations by the
states).
110 See id. at 68o (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the
price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.").
11 540 U.S. 93, 205, 209 (2003) (stating that the Court has "repeatedly sustained legislation"
that limits corporations' ability to participate in political advocacy).
112 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 ("The Court has thus rejected the argument that political
speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not 'natural persons."').
113 Id. at 938 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he Court nonethe-
less turns its back on the as-applied review process that has been a staple of campaign finance
litigation since [1976] . . ").
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restrictions facially invalid. 114 The Court also rejected the "antidistortion"
rationale of Austin, suggesting that it is irrelevant that money from the
marketplace may not come from the speaker and reasoning that all speakers
make use of money from the marketplace. 115 Finally, the Court rejected the
exemption of media corporations, reasoning they are no different, and can
even be controlled by business corporations. 116
Two years after Citizens United, in American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v.
Bullock, the Court struck down a Montana state law regulating corporate
political expenditures in a brief, less-than-one-page per curiam opinion 117 -
there was little to say once Citizens United had adopted a categorical
approach to restrictions on corporate spending.
The Court's decision to treat corporations as no different from any other
speaker has attracted attention to the case (though Justice Stevens's dissent
chiefly focused on stare decisis). Justice Sotomayor anticipated such criti-
cism at oral argument, stating that it would seem as if "the Court imbued a
creature of State law," the corporation, "with human characteristics."
118
Judges and scholars have long debated what a corporation is-whether it is
an artificial legal entity, an aggregate of individual people, or a real entity.
For example, Justice White dissented in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, arguing "when a profitmaking corporation contributes to a political
candidate this does not further the self-expression or self-fulfillment of its
shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as individuals
would."119 Justice Stevens's Citizens United dissent instead emphasized that
"[t]he financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of
corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral
process."120 He asked "'who' is even speaking when a business corporation
places an advertisement that endorses or attacks a particular candidate.'
1 21
114 Id. at 892 (majority opinion). The majority opinion treated Austin as a break from prior
precedent, distinguishing the 198os rulings as either upholding challenged regulations, or dealing
with soliciting contributions and not limiting the speech itself. Id. at 909, 912. Those efforts to
distinguish the Court's pre-Austin rulings ignore how each of the prior decisions adopted a case-
specific compelling interest test-it was not correct to attribute that test to Austin; more accurately,
in Citizens United, the Court simply rejected that prior test. The dissent in Citizens United argued
that "the majority blazes through our precedents" and marked a "dramatic break" from prior
holdings. Id. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115 Id. at 905 (majority opinion).
116 Id. at 905-07.
117 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam).
118 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205).
119 435 U.S. 765, 8o6 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
120 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121 Id. at 972.
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Some scholars argue that the Citizens United Court endorsed a real or
natural entity view that a corporation is like an individual human person in
the way that it can exercise First Amendment rights. Most prominently,
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah argued that Citizens United meant the "real entity view
prevail[ed]. '"122 1 view Citizens United very differently. The Court took great
pains not to say what a corporation is or is not. The Court was meticulous
in abandoning a taxonomy-type approach permitting different types of
organizations to be treated differently. As in other areas of constitutional
law, the result sought a single answer, all or nothing, as to whether corpora-
tions and other entities can litigate the constitutional right in question.
Interestingly, in a brief statement in his concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts treated the question as one of standing, as part of a discussion
whether the case raised a question of an as-applied or facial challenge to the
statute. Chief Justice Roberts said: "Citizens United has standing-it is
being injured by the Government's enforcement of the Act.1123
Put that way, the question of Article III standing to litigate a constitu-
tional right seems an easy one. One can imagine some organizations that
should be able to make political statements free from restriction; the
Supreme Court had said for decades that many entire categories of organi-
zations should be immune from regulation of their political speech. As
noted, under the Court's precedents, the First Amendment protects such
speech as part of an effort to promote an entire marketplace of speech. As I
have already argued, the approach that preserves one single constitutional
test as applicable to all or no organizations may do a better job of preserving
consistency in the application of the constitutional right. The Court was
clearly frustrated that a complex hodgepodge of regulatory and First
Amendment treatment depended on the type of organization, such as
whether it was a media organization, a union, or a nonprofit. Standing for
the corporation would only be problematic if the organization's interest
might be in conflict with those of its constituents. The Court addressed the
question whether shareholders might object to corporate speech by noting
122 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 26, at 1032 ("Why does the real entity view prevail? This is no
doubt due in part to the fact that it represents the most congenial view to corporate management,
because it shields management from undue interference from both shareholders and the state.").
Avi-Yonah concluded that "[c]orporate management wields political power and it influences the
outcome of the debate; judges again and again refer to the importance of corporations, by which
they mean corporate management." Id. at 1032. But "there is another reason why the real entity
view prevails: it fits reality much more than the other [theories] .... The real entity view
prevailed because it was more real than the others." Id. at 1032-33.
123 Citizens United, 13o S. Ct. at 919 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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that "[s]hareholder objections" can be "raised through the procedures of
corporate democracy."'124
Of course, the Court in Citizens United did not need to say much to
explain a decision that organizations can assert First Amendment rights
because the principle had been well established in decisions reaching back
decades. The Court briefly noted that it "has recognized that First Amend-
ment protection extends to corporations," followed with a lengthy citation
to decisions reaching back to the 193os. 12 s Having concluded that corpora-
tions have First Amendment rights, the question that provoked disagree-
ment was whether the government had a substantial interest in regulating
corporate expenditures in the way that it did. That analysis was also conse-
quentialist, as the Court engaged with the government's claim that permitting
such corporate independent expenditures could cause corruption in the
political process. 126 However, the question whether it is good litigation
policy to permit a corporation to assert a constitutional right is a very
different question, and conversely, broader social policy will influence how
one interprets the underlying substance of the constitutional right.
Deciding that all organizations can litigate their First Amendment
speech right still does not answer the second and perhaps more important
question whether certain types of entities might not be able to overcome a
compelling government interest in regulating their speech. That is a
question of substantive First Amendment law over which judges and
scholars can and should disagree.
A broader question, however, is whether Citizens United and other recent
decisions by the Supreme Court shed light on which constitutional rights
corporations may assert and which they may not. What Citizens United does
suggest is that the Court will analyze the issue by asking the general
question whether organizations can benefit from the constitutional right.
The analysis implies that a corporation or organization can effectively assert
the interests of its members or constituents. The Court assumes that the
organization has standing as long as it might be an effective constitutional
litigator, without asking what type of organization it is or what role the
rights of stakeholders inside and outside the firm have. The question is
whether all organizations have standing or not. However, as discussed next,
in contexts seen as more closely connected to government regulation of
124 Id. at 916 (majority opinion).
125 Id. at 899-900 (citing, for example, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244
(1936), in which the Court noted that a corporation is a "person" under the Due Process Clause,
which incorporated the First Amendment right in question as against the states).
126 See id. at 9o8-is.
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corporations, the Court may view the policy question whether to permit
organizational standing to litigate constitutional rights differently.
E. The Fourth Amendment
In the Fourth Amendment context, criminal procedure scholars have
typically observed that corporations have fewer privacy rights as compared
with individuals. For example, Professor Christopher Slobogin puts it this
way: "corporations have virtually no Fourth Amendment rights where it
really counts."127 I argue that in fact, corporations and individuals are
treated much the same for Fourth Amendment purposes; decisions that
appear to limit Fourth Amendment rights of corporations relate to doctrine
concerning business records and business locations that operate the same
way for both individuals and corporations.
Although we may think of the Fourth Amendment as involving a quin-
tessentially individual right, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment to protect collective interests, and has balanced those interests
against government interests.1 28 The Court emphasized in Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista that "sensitive, case-by-case determinations" may not be required,
where instead a "reasonable Fourth Amendment balance" should involve
"sufficiently clear and simple" standards and "readily administrable rules."1 29
As Thomas Clancy has argued, the "'right of the people to be secure' is a
collective right, not an individual one.' 130 As a result, the Fourth Amend-
ment cases come out in a similar place as the Court's opinion in Citizens
United, treating the right as collective and its assertion by organizations as
straightforward.
Long lines of precedent have grappled with Fourth Amendment rights
of corporations and what expectations of privacy exist in places of business,
both as to the first Fourth Amendment clause concerning freedom from
"unreasonable searches and seizures" and the second clause prohibiting
issuance of warrants except "upon probable cause.' 131 Some of the Court's
statements suggest a special concern that corporations cannot resist requests
by regulators and prosecutors for documents; the regulatory state requires
127 Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United and Corporate and Human Crime, 41 STETSON L.
REV. 127, 133 (2011).
128 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment as a Collective Right, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv.
255, 263 (2010) (arguing that, despite the "depth of precedent for the view that the Fourth
Amendment protects individual rights," the Court has "increasingly... support[ed] a collective
security model").
129 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001).
130 Clancy, supra note 128, at 296.
131 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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compliance with subpoenas for regulation to be effective. Indeed, perhaps
no area of constitutional law has affected the modern regulation of corpora-
tions more than the Court's Fourth Amendment rulings. Those rulings have
not received the attention they deserve, perhaps because the practice that
administrative agencies have broad power to investigate organizations and
request documents is so longstanding.
However, early on, the Supreme Court took a very different approach.
In its 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States, the Court held that a person did
not need to respond to a subpoena for customs invoices, since it sought "a
man's private papers. ' 13 2 Yet those were not particularly "personal" or
private papers; they were business invoices that were needed to show
whether a company was illegally importing goods into the country.133 That
was a case involving an individual person, not a corporate defendant. But
that interpretation of Fourth Amendment law made any kind of an investi-
gation into business conduct very difficult. With the rise of more modern
federal agencies designed to regulate commerce, the Court, without exten-
sive discussion, abandoned that notion by 19o6 in Hale v. Henkel, ruling that
a corporation has Fourth Amendment rights, and must comply with reasonable
subpoena requests.134
The Supreme Court in a series of rulings subsequently made clear that
extremely broad subpoenas did not violate the Fourth Amendment reasona-
bleness requirements. Some of the Court's language might be taken to
suggest that corporations were being treated differently. In 1911, the Court
ruled in Wilson v. United States that a broad request that the company
president turn over all letters and documents he signed during a certain
period of time did not violate either the Fourth or Fifth Amendments. 135 As
the Court put it in 1946 in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, "corpo-
rations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections which private
individuals have in these and related matters." 13 6 The Court noted that
historically corporations had been subject to "visitorial power" and, in a rare
instance of reasoning across corporate constitutional rights, the Court noted
that entities lack the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
(as discussed in the next Section). 3 7 Only in extreme cases of overreaching
and overbroad searches did the Court approve Fourth Amendment
132 ni6 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).
133 See id. at 636.
134 See 201 U.S. 43, 73 (19o6).
'35 221 U.S. 361, 375-76 (i9ui).
136 327 U.S. 186, 205 (1946).
137 Id. at 204-05.
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challenges by corporations to subpoenas seeking documents. 13 8 In Walling,
the Court explained that "the Fourth, if applicable, at the most guards
against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the
things required to be 'particularly described,' if also the inquiry is one the
demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials specified
are relevant.' ' 39
In perhaps the best known of this line of Fourth Amendment cases in-
volving subpoenas for corporate records, United States v. Morton Salt Co., the
Court treated as unsettled whether corporations had Fourth Amendment
rights, stating "[iut is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a
corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment." 140 But
the Court went on to emphasize that "corporations can claim no equality
with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy."141 Further, the
Court was tolerant of a quite broad federal search by the Federal Trade
Commission; even if it was "caused by nothing more than official curiosity,"
the FTC could satisfy itself that the company was "consistent with law and
the public interest."1 4 2
What may have been animating those decisions was a generally deferen-
tial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's role in regulating administra-
tive subpoenas, replacing the Boyd rule with a new rule that applied to both
individuals and corporations. The new and more forgiving rule was grounded
in an approach supporting the interests of regulators in supervising busi-
nesses by examining business records. For regulators, information is "the
fuel without which the administrative engine could not operate."143 And
similarly in criminal prosecutions, as Professor William Stuntz put it, "[i]n
antitrust or mail fraud or tax evasion cases, the damning documents may be
everything-there is no equivalent to crime scene evidence, and witnesses
138 See, e.g., Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151
, 
S6 (1923) (stating that unreasonable
searches "against which the corporation was protected by the Fourth Amendment" work to
"vitiate[] all the subsequent proceedings to compel production"); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390-92 (1920) (rejecting government's desire to keep documents
obtained during blatantly unreasonable search). But see Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 142-
43 (1928) (finding that a broad subpoena asking for a large range of documents covering a large
time period was not overly broad); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306
(1924) (suggesting that Congress might be able to permit a "fishing expedition" into the private
papers of a company to search for evidence of a crime).
139 327 U.S. at 208.
140 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950).
141 Id. at 652.
142 Id.
143 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW § 3.1 (3d ed. 5995).
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are typically involved in the crime."144 However much animated by concerns
of effective regulation of business, it is not a different rule regarding Fourth
Amendment rights of corporations-the Court decided as early as Hale that
corporations do have Fourth Amendment rights-but limited rights to
challenge the "reasonableness" of subpoenas.
Moreover, it is nothing foreign to Fourth Amendment law to consider,
by way of interpreting "reasonableness," regulatory or law enforcement
interests. The Court has created Fourth Amendment rules to balance
privacy interests against the interest of law enforcement in solving crimes:
there is the exclusionary rule that prohibits the use at trial of illegally seized
evidence. However, the rule incorporates all sorts of detailed exceptions,
including rules that allow police to search evidence in "plain view," or due to
"exigency," or to search someone as part of an arrest, or if the suspect
provides consent. It should be no surprise that Fourth Amendment rules for
searches of businesses and regulated industries would include similar types
of balancing. Nor should it be surprising that based on standard Fourth
Amendment doctrine, individuals' homes receive more protection, while
business premises would not be treated the same way.145 Corporations may
have standing to litigate Fourth Amendment rights, but the underlying
right may not benefit corporations to the same degree.
Nevertheless, the same rules formally apply to corporations and individuals
when the government wants to do a physical search. Does the government
need to get a warrant before it searches a business? The answer is yes-
usually. While the typical rule is that searches conducted without a warrant
"are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,"' 1 46 the Court has
crafted exceptions. One large exception is for suspicionless checkpoints or
police roadblocks. The Court has approved warrantless check point stops
near borders to search vehicles for illegal aliens, as well as checkpoints for
checking drivers' licenses, checking for sobriety, conducting agricultural
inspections, checking for fleeing fugitives, or checking for "safety require-
ments, weight limits, and similar matters." 147 A second exception is for
routine inventory searches of impounded vehicles. 48
144 William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 859-60 (2001).
145 See Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amend-
ment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 921-22 (2010) (arguing that robust Fourth Amendment protection
of the private residence served to decrease protection of other spaces, such as businesses).
146 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
147 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 n.14 (1976) (finding border
checkpoints constitutional); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004) (finding highway
checkpoints to ask for information about a recently committed crime constitutional); City of
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Another narrow exception, however, is for warrantless searches of certain
pervasively regulated industries. The Court held in Camara v. Municipal
Court in 1967 that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures and warrantless searches in both civil
and criminal investigations. 149 That same year, in See v. City of Seattle, the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless
inspections of commercial premises. 5 0 In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., the
Court examined a provision in the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (OSHA Act) that allowed agents of the Secretary of Labor to conduct
warrantless searches of covered employment facilities. 51 The president of
Barlow's, Inc. refused to allow the inspectors to enter the premises, citing
his Fourth Amendment rights.15 2 The Court emphasized that "the Fourth
Amendment's commands grew in large measure out of the colonists'
experience with the writs of assistance ... [that] granted sweeping power to
customs officials and other agents of the King to search at large for smug-
gled goods."15 3 The "particular offensiveness" of the general warrant and
writ of assistance "was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose
premises and products were inspected" under their authority.15 4 The Court
concluded that "it is untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was not
intended to shield places of business as well as of residence .
s5
The Court has only created very limited exceptions from the search
warrant requirement for "pervasively regulated business' 156 and for "closely
regulated" industries that have been "long subject to close supervision and
inspection." 15 7 In Biswell, the Court sustained warrantless searches of
firearms dealers under the Gun Control Act of 1968, reasoning that the
regulatory inspections "further[ed] urgent federal interest."15 8 The Court
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (suggesting roadblocks for fleeing felons are
constitutional); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (finding sobriety
checkpoints constitutional); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 73o , 739 (1983) (plurality opinion) (upholding
driver's license checkpoints); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887-88 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that agricultural checkpoints should be constitutional).
148 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at S68 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing previous cases in
which the Court approved inventory searches of vehicles in police custody).
149 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
150 387 U.S. 541, 543-44 (1967).
151 436 U.S. 307, 309 (1978).
152 Id. at 309-10.
'53 Id. at 311 (alternations in original) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977)).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 312.
156 See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
157 See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970).
158 406 U.S. at 317.
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noted in Barlow's that in those industries, "when an entrepreneur embarks
upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full
arsenal of governmental regulation," but seemed to cabin the exception to
state-licensed industries like firearms and liquor stores. 5 9 Similarly, the
Court held in Donovan v. Dewey in 1981 that federal mine inspectors may
conduct warrantless inspections.1 60 The Court noted that "it is the perva-
siveness and regularity of the federal regulation that ultimately determines
whether a warrant is necessary to render an inspection program reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.' 1
61
Thus, the pervasively regulated industry exception is quite narrow, and
largely limited to a few industries that have long been subject to regulation.
Most recently, in New York v. Burger in 1987, the Court held that an auto-
mobile junkyard could be subject to warrantless regulatory searches but
reaffirmed that such warrantless searches are only acceptable for a select few
narrow, pervasively regulated industries. 162 Outside the exception, regulators
must use a warrant (unless, which is often the case, statutes or regulations
require the company to maintain records and examine transactions, without
necessarily disclosing them). 63 The exception is not different in kind from
the situations (including border checkpoints and impounded vehicles) in
which individuals may be subject to warrantless searches. The exception is
limited and related to certain regulated and carefully defined areas.
One of the most interesting Fourth Amendment cases was brought to
challenge a search and seizure of a company. The Dow Chemical Company
opposed the EPA's use of aerial surveillance to inspect a massive 2ooo-acre
chemical manufacturing complex in Michigan for compliance with envi-
ronmental laws and regulations.164 The Court found that manufacturing
sites do not enjoy the same privacy protections as the area around a home-and
159 436 U.S. at 313.
160 452 U.S. 594, 6o (198t).
161 Id. at 6o6.
162 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987).
163 In California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, bankers challenged the Bank Secrecy Act, which
regulates banks and requires adequate records to be kept on certain types of financial transac-
tions-including those that might be important in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and
proceedings. 416 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1974). For example, automatic reports are to be generated when
large amounts of currency are deposited or withdrawn, out of a concern that such transactions may
involve money laundering or other forms of criminality. Id. at 26-27. Among the many constitu-
tional challenges, the Court found the reporting provisions reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Id. at 67. The Court also found the provisions to be reasonable and constitutional under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, noting that these were "artificial entities." Id. at 49,
66. The Court also held that it did not violate the rights of third-party customers for banks to be
required to maintain these records. Id. at 52-53.
164 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1986).
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that, in particular, private homes have the most heightened privacy protec-
tions.' 65 The Court did note that "[a]ny actual physical entry by EPA into
any enclosed area would raise significantly different questions, because
'[t]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional
right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon
his private commercial property.""166 The decision appeared to give less
Fourth Amendment protection to a business because, after all, a person's
home is a far more private place. However, the Court suggested that the
interior portions of the factory would have protection. 67 Moreover, just a
few years later, the Court held that it was not unreasonable when police
flew a helicopter over a person's backyard without a warrant to determine
whether he was growing marijuana.1 68
Once again, maybe people and corporations are not treated so differently
for Fourth Amendment purposes. Corporations have standing to litigate
Fourth Amendment rights to challenge searches of corporate premises,
something which individuals, such as employees and officers, would lack
standing to do if they were not the target of the search. Once the corpora-
tion asserts a challenge, it does not appear to benefit from special Fourth
Amendment rules, and, if anything, the justifications for substantive Fourth
Amendment doctrine have led the Court to craft interpretations of the
Fourth Amendment that are adapted for investigations of business miscon-
duct and white collar crime. The criminal procedure rules would not likely
look any different if corporations lacked Fourth Amendment rights and only
employees could individually assert Fourth Amendment rights at their
workplaces.
F. The Fifth Amendment
The Citizens United Court noted that the relevant election laws con-
tained criminal prohibitions.169 Does Citizens United mean "the final blow
against those who resist criminal liability for corporations," as Professor
Christopher Slobogin puts it? 70 Perhaps not, precisely because prosecutions
of corporations have long been thought important. Corporations may not
165 See id. at 237-38.
166 Id. at 237 (alteration in original) (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967)).
167 See id. at 239 ("An electronic device to penetrate walls or windows ... would raise very
different and far more serious questions ....").
168 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (plurality opinion).
169 130 S. Ct. at 888-89. The criminal provisions were not directly at issue there because
Citizens United had affirmatively sought to enjoin application of the statute.
170 Slobogin, supra note 127, at 129.
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take the Fifth. The Court held in Hale v. Henkel that a corporation's agent
may not assert a corporation's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination in response to a government subpoena. 171 The Court
explained that "the corporation is a creature of the State" and in addition,
"[w]hile an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions
unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corpora-
tion, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its
hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges."'72 The ruling focused
on the inability of individuals to assert the corporation's Fifth Amendment
rights to justify not testifying, explaining that the right not to testify is
purely personal. 173 Yet the Court also noted that "[i]n organizing itself as a
collective body [the corporation] waives no constitutional immunities
appropriate to such body."
174
The reasoning of the Supreme Court was not that corporations inher-
ently lack criminal procedure rights, given that the Court in that same
opinion importantly recognized a Fourth Amendment right of corporations
to resist overbroad subpoenas. Instead, the Court's rationale was that
corporations should not be permitted to entirely shield individual conduct
from regulators and that individual employees should not be able to deriva-
tively assert the corporation's rights to themselves refuse to comply with
official requests. The Court's reasoning was consequentialist. 17
In adopting this consequentialist approach when denying organizational
standing to assert a right, the Supreme Court has subsequently refused to
distinguish among most (but not all) types of corporations, rejecting the
Austin-type fine-grained taxonomy approach. The Court's Fifth Amendment
doctrine in this area has been termed the "collective entity rule," since the
rule applies not just to corporations. In addition, an individual may not
assert the Fifth Amendment rights of any organization defined functionally
as one that "has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership
and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely
private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their
common or group interests only."76 The Court subsequently made clear
171 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (0o6).
172 Id. at 74-75.
173 Id. at 69.
174 Id. at 76.
175 For a brief defense of this reasoning as additionally consistent with the Supreme Court's
rationale for criminal liability of corporations generally, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO
JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 217 (2014).
176 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85,100 (1974) (quoting White, 322 U.S. at 701).
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that, since the records are corporate in nature, corporate officers could not
resist process."7 The blanket rule that organizations have no Fifth Amend-
ment rights has led to some complications, including whether one-person
corporations also lack Fifth Amendment rights. The Court has ruled that
sole proprietorships are not collective entities and do have Fifth Amend-
ment rights.178
The Supreme Court has also highlighted that organizations simply do
not have the personal privacy interests that individual people have. The
Fifth Amendment "respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling
and thought" and seeks to protect it from state compulsion. 79 That reasoning
adds something else to the consequentalist justification that corporate Fifth
Amendment rights would impair government investigations. It suggests that
the self-incrimination right simply cannot be delegated from the individual
to the corporation. One person cannot refuse to speak to police under the
Fifth Amendment by asserting the potential to incriminate another person.
That said, even if a corporation had Fifth Amendment rights, an individual
officer could not claim the self-incrimination right of a corporation, and as I
will discuss, the practical consequences might not be nearly so great as the
Court supposed in Hale.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that line of reasoning in 2010 in a Freedom
of Information Act case, FCC v. AT&T Inc., where AT&T objected to the
FCC disclosing, pursuant to a trade association's FOIA request, documents
it had provided to the FCC.180 AT&T argued that it had "personal privacy"
as a corporation, and that it should be protected by a FOIA exception,
which says that, based on Fourth Amendment principles, law enforcement
records should not be disclosed if they "could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."181 The Court, in an
177 Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 158 (1923) (holding that a corporate officer, "as
agent of the corporation," is not protected against a request to produce corporate documents);
Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394, 400 (sg9s) ("[Because the corporate records] were the
documents of the corporation in his custody, and not his private papers, [the defendant] was under
obligation to produce them when called for by proper process."); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361, 383-84 (1911) (reasoning that a corporation, because it is a creature of the state, must be
amenable to inquiry by the state into its operations and accounts); In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279
(1911) (requiring bankrupt to forfeit books even if they contained evidence of criminal activity).
178 See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 6o5, 6o6, 611-12 (1984); Shauna J. Sullivan, Comment,
Fifth Amendment Protection and the Production of Corporate Documents, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 747, 754
(1987) (reviewing cases wherein courts held that an individual involved in a sole proprietorship
was protected from self-incrimination).
179 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 8S, 91 (1974) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 327 (1973)).
180 131 S. Ct. 1177, 118o-81 (2011).
181 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012).
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opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by all of the justices but
Justice Kagan who was recused, rejected that argument and said that
"personal" (as opposed to "person") normally refers to individuals, and not
corporations. 182 Thus, "[w]e do not usually speak of personal characteristics,
personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or personal
tragedy as referring to corporations or other artificial entities."1 83 Quite the
contrary, "we often use the word 'personal' to mean precisely the opposite of
business-related: [w]e speak of personal expenses and business expenses,
personal life and work life, personal opinion and a company's view."184 In a
charming final note, Chief Justice Roberts concluded: "The protection in
FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground that
it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not
extend to corporations. We trust that AT&T will not take it personally."85
A separate concern cited in the Fifth Amendment context relates to
criminal investigations, which requires the balancing of privacy interests
against the effectiveness of law enforcement. As the Supreme Court put it
in United States v. White in 1944, "[w]ere the cloak of the privilege to be
thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effective enforce-
ment of many federal and state laws would be impossible."18 6 Unlike other
criminal investigations, in corporate crime or white collar cases the most
crucial evidence may be in the possession of the corporation. Early cases
required production if the documents in question were corporate rather
than personal, meaning that a custodian of business records serving the
corporation could not object to turning such documents over. 8 7 Later cases
abandoned that distinction and found that collective entities were simply
not entitled to Fifth Amendment protection. 8 8 Nor, moreover, could the
members of an entity claim privilege as to materials owned by the entity.
Members could, however, claim individual privilege if asked to testify.8 9
182 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1182.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1185.
186 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944).
187 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 109- lo (1988); see also Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974) ("[R]ecognition of [an] individual's claim of privilege with respect to the
financial records of the organization would substantially undermine the unchallenged rule that the
organization itself is not entitled to claim any Fifth Amendment privilege, and largely frustrate
legitimate governmental regulation of such organizations.").
188 See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104-12 (describing evolution of the collective entity doctrine).
189 See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957) (holding that a corporate custodian
cannot be compelled to give oral testimony about where business records are located if the
information would be self-incriminatory).
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The Court ruled in Fisher v. United States in 1976 that the contents of
business records are not ordinarily regarded as privileged because they are
created voluntarily and without state compulsion. 90 However, such records
may be the subject of testimony if the custodian is asked to identify or
authenticate the documents; if so, then this "act of production" may be
protected by the Fifth Amendment.1 91
The rule in Fisher obviates the need for the Hale rule that corporations
lack Fifth Amendment rights. If business records themselves lack Fifth
Amendment protection, then giving a corporation Fifth Amendment
protection would have little practical meaning, since a corporation cannot
itself be interrogated and cannot "speak" during an investigation. Moreover,
the other privileges that a corporation does possess-such as attorney-client
privilege, as the Court recognized in Upjohn Co. v. United States192-do not
pose significant practical obstacles to law enforcement, which can reward
cooperation, or even the waiver of privilege, when considering whether to
provide a firm with leniency. 19
In 1988, the Supreme Court ruled in Braswell v. United States that the
president of a company could be held in contempt for refusing to produce
corporate records. 94 As custodian, he could have immunity from testifying
but not from producing document. 195 The Court reiterated that giving
corporations Fifth Amendment rights "would have a detrimental impact on
the Government's efforts to prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the most
serious problems confronting law enforcement authorities."'196 Thus, in some
respects, the Court's refusal to apply the Fifth Amendment to entities
eroded the rights of an organization's individual members.
Individuals have more protection against self-incrimination when they
are called to testify about requested documents. In the more recent case of
United States v. Hubbell, the Supreme Court stated that if officials do not
190 425 U.S. 391, 409-10 (1976).
191 See id. at 412-13 (noting that the production of documents could violate the Fifth
Amendment if the production implicated authentication but finding it did not in this case).
192 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981).
193 See Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 927 (2008)
(describing practices of prosecutors and agencies that may use cooperation, or the waiver of
privilege, as a factor in deciding which firms should be treated with leniency).
194 487 U.S. 99, 117 (1988) (affirming corporate custodians cannot resist subpoenas "on the
ground that [the] act of production will be personally incriminating").
195 Id. at 116-17.
196 Id. at n5. For criticism of the Court's reasoning, see Note, Organizational Papers and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L. REV. 640, 648 (1986) ("Because the fifth
amendment is concerned with the integrity of the process of law enforcement, its effect on the
success of prosecutions should be relatively unimportant.").
[Vol. 163: 95
Constitutional Standing of Corporations
know the precise location of documents, providing a response to a subpoena
might be self-incriminating since the very act of production would disclose
"the mental and physical steps necessary" to provide that "accurate inven-
tory."197 However, the act-of-production defense still does not apply to a
corporate officer asked to produce records. 198 The "collective entity" rule
still governs, 199 preventing corporations from shielding themselves or their
employees from criminal exposure.
This reasoning simply does not fit the Supreme Court's approach to
other constitutional rights, particularly in the way that the corporations'
lack of constitutional protection also has the potential to deprive individuals
of constitutional protection. In Part III, I argue that the Court has it wrong,
since its analysis should focus on whether organizational standing interferes
with effective litigation of individual rights, especially because extending
Fifth Amendment rights to corporations will not meaningfully impede civil
or criminal investigations.
G. The Double Jeopardy Clause
Outside of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Supreme Court has
extended other Fifth Amendment protections to corporations. The Court
held in Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States in 1931 that the Takings Clause
extended to a Russian corporation, entitling it to just compensation.200 As
noted, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to corpora-
tions the same as it applies to individuals. Further, the Supreme Court held
in 1977 in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. that prosecuting a corpo-
ration for a second time after the reversal of an acquittal would violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 201 (The Court has never addressed whether the
Double Jeopardy Clause applies to corporations, but seems to have assumed
it.20 2) The Court in Martin Linen cited to the purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause: to protect one from "personal strain,"203 the "embarrassment,
197 530 U.S. 27, 42-43 (2000).
198 See id. at 36 ("[Respondent] could not avoid compliance with the subpoena served on him
merely because the demanded [corporate] documents contained incriminating evidence ....").
199 See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104 (explaining collective entities such as corporations are not
treated like individuals).
200 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931).
201 430 U.S. 564, 567 (1977).
202 See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam) (concluding that
trying the petitioners, one of which was a corporation, for a second time after acquittal would
violate the Fifth Amendment).
203 430 U.S. at 569 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)).
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expense and ordeal," 20 4 and "anxiety and insecurity" of another trial 20 5
without justifying how those reasons could or should apply to corporations.
H. Fines: The Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Due Process
The story of jury trial rights of corporations is consistent with the larger
story I tell in this Article. Federal courts have recognized both Sixth
Amendment jury trial rights in criminal cases and Seventh Amendment
jury trial rights in civil cases. 20 6 One could argue that corporations do not
require a jury of their peers or a community voice in a civil or a criminal
trial. On the other hand, when a corporation can sue and be sued, perhaps
having decided the question of standing, we can see why the court would
then assume that any litigant should receive the same trial protections. The
principle of jury trial rights for organizations has been extended in both the
civil and criminal contexts, but in ways that limit fines in cases of particular
interest to corporations.
The jury trial right itself is unexceptional. The substantive interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment, though, provides more meaningful protections to
corporations, but it does not arise at all from the fact that corporations have
Sixth Amendment rights. It arose first in the Court's landmark 2000
decision Apprendi v. New Jersey, which interpreted the Sixth Amendment to
require certain sentencing facts to be charged to the jury.20 7 The Supreme
Court in its 2012 decision Southern Union Co. v. United States held that a
criminal fine imposed on a corporation for environmental violations violated
the Sixth Amendment rights of the corporation, where the fine was imposed
in excess of the statutory maximum based on facts not charged to the
jury.208
The case involved illegal storage of a hazardous material, liquid mercury,
under environmental statutes that based the fine on the number of days that
204 Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
205 Id. (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88).
206 See United States v. R. L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 1971) (reducing the
penalty on a corporation because a jury trial had not been granted nor the right to a jury trial
waived); United States v. Greenpeace, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (assuming
corporations have the right to trial by jury, but ultimately rejecting the right in this case because
the potential penalty was not severe enough); see also Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 838 (1994) ("We conclude that the serious contempt fines imposed here
were criminal and constitutionally could not be imposed absent a jury trial."); Ross v. Bernhard,
396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970) (noting that a shareholder would have the same right to a jury trial as a
corporation); Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 73 (19o8) (discussing the Sixth
Amendment right to have a jury trial in the state where the alleged crime occurred).
207 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
208 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012).
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the violation lasted.20 9 The number of days in question was not included in
the indictment, and the judge did not ask the jury to make a finding on the
precise number of days. 10 The Supreme Court had never said before that
criminal fines must be calculated based on a jury finding facts "beyond a
reasonable doubt." The Government argued that the reasoning of Apprendi
was based on the idea that the role of the jury is crucial where there is a
"physical deprivation of liberty. '211 Unlike individuals, companies can only
be fined, not jailed. However, the Court noted that "[w]hile the punish-
ments at stake in those [prior] cases were imprisonment or a death sentence,
we see no principled basis under Apprendi for treating criminal fines differ-
ently.''212 The Court added that "[c]riminal fines, like these other forms of
punishment, are penalties inflicted by the sovereign for the commission of
offenses. Fines were by far the most common form of noncapital punish-
ment in colonial America."2 13 The Court found that fines are particularly
important in prosecutions of "organizational defendants who cannot be
imprisoned."214 The Court noted that in 2011, "a fine was imposed on 9.0%
of individual defendants and on 70.6% of organizational defendants in the
federal system." 21s
That ruling also impacts cases in which an individual is sentenced and
must pay a large fine. The case happened to involve a corporation, and the
Court noted that corporations chiefly pay fines, but the interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment was formally neutral. 216 Other rulings proceed similarly
when examining constitutional questions surrounding fines. Do corpora-
tions have Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment? The Court has not reached that question. 217 Instead, the Court
has extended the Due Process Clause to regulate "fines" in the civil context
209 Id. at 2349.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 2351.
212 Id. at 2350.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 2350 n.2.
216 For a more in-depth discussion of Southern Union and its implications for corporate criminal
prosecutions and white collar prosecutions more broadly, see GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra
note 175, at 196-200.
217 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22
(1989) ("We shall not decide ... whether the Eighth Amendment protects corporations as well as
individuals."). But see id. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting
that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to corporations).
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by placing constitutional limits on punitive damages awards.218 The Court's
rulings do not ask whether corporations have standing to challenge arbitrary
jury awards of punitive damages. The Court nevertheless comes close to
considering corporate-specific factors when assessing excessiveness of
punitive damages awards. 219
I. Structural Provisions
Finally, corporations have asserted challenges based on structural provisions
of the Constitution. In these cases, where a company raises a separation-of-
powers issue as a defense in litigation, courts have entertained the challenges
without comment. 220
III. INCORPORATION OF SUBSTANTIVE CORPORATE RIGHTS
When can an organization litigate an injury to the entity? The question
should be viewed as a threshold question of Article III standing. The
Supreme Court has not often articulated the question in standing terms-
recall the very brief reference to standing by Chief Justice Roberts in
Citizens United221-but many of its corporate constitutional rights rulings
predate modern standing jurisprudence. I argue that an Article III standing
framework provides a useful guide to understanding whether an organiza-
tion can litigate constitutional rights.
218 See generally Philip Morris USA v. Williams, S49 U.S. 346, 357 (2007); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,428 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
580 (1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991).
219 For example, the bar on permitting the jury to consider "harm caused strangers to the
litigation" for purposes of assessing injuries, but permitting those considerations measuring
reprehensibility, would tend to arise far more often with an organizational defendant. Philip
Morris, 549 U.S. at 357; see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424 (calling evidence concerning reprehen-
sibility "tangential," including investigation regarding "the manner in which State Farm's policies
corrupted its employees").
220 See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56-57 (1982)
(considering a corporation's Article III separation-of-powers challenge to the structure contem-
plated by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978). For discussion of the case, see Martin H. Redish & Peter
B. Siegal, Constitutional Adjudication, Free Expression, and the Fashionable Art of Corporation Bashing,
91 TEX. L. REV. 1447, 1455 (2013) (reviewing TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012)) ("The holding that an injured
corporation has standing to object to a constitutional violation of the separation of powers was so
well established that the Court took plaintiff's standing for granted."). For a general discussion of
standing for individual litigants to raise challenges regarding structural provisions of the
Constitution, see generally Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV.
1435 (2013).
221 See 130 S. Ct. at 919 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (mentioning that Citizens United had
standing because it was injured by enforcement of the statute).
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The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must be able to show a cog-
nizable "injury in fact" to have a case or controversy that may be heard by
an Article III court. 222 The Court recently summarized its Article III test as
follows: an injury must be "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling."22 Moreover, the Court has emphasized that "[t]he party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements." 224
Two lines of cases are particularly crucial to the question of constitu-
tional litigation by organizations. First, one line of cases holds that organi-
zations can raise constitutional rights by asserting a concrete injury to its
own interests but not those of others. Second, and in contrast, the Supreme
Court adopts a more flexible test for associations and membership organiza-
tions that permits standing to assert the potentially broader interests of
individual members. Relatedly, in a line of prudential third-party non-
Article III standing cases largely developed in the context of individual
litigation, the Court has long held that a litigant typically does not have
standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of a third party absent some
special relationship and some special barrier to the non-party litigating the
right. 2 5 There are complexities to that body of Article III and prudential
standing doctrine, and there are resulting questions over what qualifies as an
organization versus an association and how to treat nonprofit corporations
or religious nonprofits. I will address those questions in turn.
A. Associational Standing
The Supreme Court's test for associational standing remains permissive
and broad. The Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson emphasized the
common interests of members of an association and described how the
association is "but the medium through which its individual members seek
to make more effective the expression of their own views. ' 226 The Court
222 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (noting that Article III
requires that a plaintiff show he has suffered an injury in fact).
223 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010).
224 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
225 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) ("In the ordinary course, a litigant must
assert his or her own legal rights and interests .... ); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) ("In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to
assert the rights of third persons.").
226 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) ("The associa-
tion must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened
injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the
members themselves brought suit.").
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directed the judge to focus on whether the relief sought would reasonably
benefit the members of the organization, whether "the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization's purpose,"227 whether one or more
members would have standing to sue individually, and whether there are
issues of "individualized proof," permitting the claims to be "properly
resolved in a group context." 228 Thus, the Court has emphasized that it can
be preferable to have an association sue for consequentialist reasons. The
Court in UAW v. Brock noted that "an association suing to vindicate the
interests of its members can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise
and capital."2 29
The test for associational standing does not closely examine the governance
of the group. The association need not even be a traditional membership
organization. It may sue if "for all practical purposes" it serves the interests
of others.2 30 As the Court put it in Brock, "[t]he very forces that cause
individuals to band together in an association will thus provide some
guarantee that the association will work to promote their interests."
231
What Article III limit is there on the ability of an association to stand in
for the constitutional rights of its members? The Court has merely noted
that if there was evidence that an association did not "represent adequately
the interests of all their injured members," then there would be a due
process problem with permitting a judgment by the association to bind the
members in subsequent litigation.2 32 Further, the Court has held that if the
underlying claim or relief requested requires individual participation, then
associational standing is not proper.233 As a result, there may be sound
reasons to treat nonprofit organizations and other types of organizations as
associations if they, like membership organizations, represent the viewpoints
of individuals. However, as discussed next, a for-profit corporation cannot
do so given its legal structure and lacks the ability to litigate injury to
others.
Some have criticized decisions like Citizens United for appearing to privi-
lege associations and organizations. For example, Professor Wayne Batchis
227 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,343 (1977).
228 Id. at 343-44 (describing three-part test for associational standing).
229 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986).
230 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344; see Karl S. Coplan, Is Voting Necessary? Organizational Standing and
Non-Voting Members of Environmental Advocacy Organizations, 14 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47,
75 (2oo5) (noting that the holdings of the Court suggest there can be associational standing even
"without a formal voting membership").
231 477 U.S. at 290.
232 Id.
233 Hunt, 423 U.S. at 343; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321 (198o).
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complains, "the freedom of association has become a freedom of the associa-
tion."234 However, there are policy reasons that support allowing an associa-
tion to stand in for the interests of members.23 5 The reasons are similar to
the reasons why class action practice permits injured individuals to gather
together and sue in the aggregate.23 6 Aggregate litigation can provide more
effective representation, attract better resources for the litigation, and make
it feasible to litigate individual injuries that would not be economically
feasible to litigate individually. 23 7
B. Organizational Standing
Organizational standing analysis is quite different than associational
standing analysis. When an organization sues to assert its own interests,
which are necessarily distinct from those of its shareholders or owners, the
Article III inquiry proceeds by asking whether the entity itself suffered a
"concrete injury" to its own interests, apart from any separately identified
injury to third parties, such as employees, officers, owners, or shareholders. 23 8
To be sure, more is required than an abstract "interest in a problem," in
order to satisfy the first "concrete injury" element of the analysis. For
example, the Court famously held in Sierra Club v. Morton that under the
Administrative Procedure Act, "a mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter
how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization
is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself."2 39 As a matter of
Article III standing, the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife held that a
234 Wayne Batchis, Citizens United and the Paradox of "Corporate Speech": From Freedom of
Association to Freedom of the Association, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 5, 7 (2012).
235 See Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, supra note 33, at 637-38 (describing indi-
vidualized constitutional remedies and their impact); see also Heidi Li Feldman, Note, Divided We
Fall: Associational Standing and Collective Interest, 87 MICH. L. REV. 733, 744-45 (1988) (advocating
theory of "collective standing").
236 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendments ("Subdi-
vision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time,
effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without
sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results."); Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 1o9 F.3 d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The policy at the very core of the class action
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action .... A class action solves this problem by aggregating the
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's ... labor.").
237 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.03
(2010) (supporting aggregate treatment under given conditions).
238 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972); see also Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982) ("[O]rganizations are entitled to sue on their own behalf
for injuries they have sustained.").
239 405 U.S. at 739.
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plaintiff organization must provide the court with "a factual showing of
perceptible harm."240
A second related principle has been less well developed in the case law.
Not only must the organization claim an injury to the interests of the
organization, but the particular harm that the corporation suffers must also
implicate or be caused by the violation of the right being asserted by the
entity. This is where, I argue, the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby
began to get it wrong by ignoring such requirements and casting further
doubt on whether prior rulings in cases like Sierra Club and Lujan were so
principled after all.
i. The Hobby Lobby Decision
In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court ruled on the question whether the
contraception mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
burdens a corporation's right to religious exercise under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.241 The status of corporate standing was
prominent in the confusion in the pre-Hobby Lobby lower court rulings
concerning challenges to the Affordable Care Act's contraception mandate.
Some lower courts had held that free exercise claims, although only individuals
can themselves exercise religious practices, can be asserted by organizations
on a derivative or third-party theory of prudential standing,2 42 while others
disagreed and held that free exercise claims are purely personal or cannot be
litigated by secular organizations. 243 Some opinions instead emphasized that
240 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992).
241 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014).
242 See, e.g., Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 68o F.3d 194, 212 (2d Cir.
2012) (finding no Free Exercise Clause violation when the challenged act is "neutral, generally
applicable, minimally burdensome, and has a rational basis"); Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3 d
11o9, 112o & n.9 (9 th Cir. 2009) ("We have held that a corporation has standing to assert the free
exercise right of its owners.... [Ain organization that asserts the free exercise rights of its owners
need not be primarily religious .... "). The Tenth Circuit badly fractured in a decision concerning
the standing of a corporation to assert free exercise rights in opposing contraception coverage for
employees, including under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), but there was
somewhat more agreement on the question of standing. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
723 F.3 d 1114, 1154 (0oth Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) ("I do not understand the
government or any of my colleagues to dispute the Greens' Article III standing."). But see id. at
1162 (Bacharach, J., concurring) ("I believe we should instruct the district court to dismiss the
Greens' claims under the shareholder-standing rule."); id. at 1177 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (agreeing with Judge Bacharach's concurring opinion on the issue of
standing).
243 See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3 d 1208, 1214 (D.C. Cir.
2013) ("When it comes to corporate entities, only religious organizations are accorded the
protections of the [Free Exercise] Clause."); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S.
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if a regulation costs money for a corporation to comply with or creates
financial penalties for noncompliance, then the company may challenge the
regulation, even if the particular constitutional right is not one that relates
to a financial interest.2 44 Several lower courts had also addressed whether
the ACA burdens a First Amendment religious exercise right: the Seventh
and Tenth Circuits have entertained the claim, 245 while the D.C. Circuit has
found "no basis for concluding a secular organization can exercise reli-
gion." 246 The Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby briefly stated that the companies
had standing to litigate the First Amendment and statutory claims because
they "face an imminent loss of money, traceable to the contraceptive-
coverage requirement," but that court did not describe any harm to the
plaintiff corporation's asserted right to free exercise. 247 That reasoning
instead corresponded with the government's position in the Affordable Care
Act litigation, which asserts that only the owners of companies can claim an
injury to free exercise rights, on their own behalf, while the corporation
must comply with the Act. 248
Writing for the majority in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito rejected that rea-
soning initially by stating that "[t]he plain terms of RFRA make it perfectly
clear that Congress did not discriminate in this way against men and women
who wish to run their businesses as for-profit corporations in the manner
required by their religious beliefs. '249 Others may debate, as Justice Ginsburg
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3 d 377, 388 (3 d Cir. 2013) (holding, without conducting a
standing analysis, that "the free exercise claims of a company's owners cannot 'pass through' to the
corporation"). The Supreme Court expressed doubt on the subject in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 321 (198o), where the Court noted that a free exercise challenge in the context of associational
standing analysis is "one that ordinarily requires individual participation."
244 See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 667 (7th Cir. 2013) ("The threat of financial penalty
and other enforcement action is easily sufficient to establish standing to challenge the mandate
prior to its enforcement."); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3 d at 1126 (finding Article III standing, noting that
"[b]oth companies face an imminent loss of money, traceable to the contraceptive-coverage
requirement").
245 See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135 ("We see no reason the Supreme Court would recognize
constitutional protection for a corporation's political expression but not its religious expression.");
see also Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 85o, 854-55 (7th Cit. 2013) (holding that the plaintiffs, a family
and its private business, had a likelihood of success under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
and would not be forced to follow the contraception mandate in the ACA).
246 See Gilardi, 733 F.3 d at 12 5; see also Conestoga, 724 F.3 d at 385 (determining that for-profit,
secular corporations cannot exercise religion).
247 See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3 d at 126.
248 See Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 18, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 87o F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012)
(No. Civ. 12-1000) (arguing plaintiff "cannot establish a substantial burden on his religious exercise
by invoking [a] trickle-down theory").
249 34 S. Ct. at 2759.
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did in dissent, whether that is a correct reading of RFRA's text, which uses
the term "persons" but does not detail which types of entities have standing
to raise religious exercise objections to regulations. 250
However, what was a particularly stark departure was that the majority
in Hobby Lobby acted as if answering the question of statutory standing
(whether Congress intended to allow for-profit corporate persons to sue)
was sufficient, without so much as addressing the question of the Article III
organizational standing of the three plaintiff corporations. The Court not
only avoided reaching the First Amendment claim raised by the parties,
251
but the Court was completely silent on the question of Article III standing.
The issue was not strongly pressed by the parties, but it was mentioned at
oral arguments,252 and it was an important subject of lower court rulings, as
described. 253
Moreover, it is a federal court's Article III obligation to ensure that
standing is present, while it is the plaintiff's burden to show standing. None
other than Chief Justice Roberts, then a practicing lawyer, defended the
Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife in a lengthy law review
article by pointing out that, even though Congress provided statutory
standing under the Endangered Species Act, the plaintiffs lacked Article III
standing, and citing to the importance of the "injury in fact" requirements
as part of an important "judicial self-restraint" and reliance on precedent.254
If so, then by way of contrast, Hobby Lobby's failure to address whether
the three for-profit corporations could make out an "injury in fact" was
inconsistent with precedent. In order to have corporate standing, the
company itself must articulate more than a "mere interest" in the subject
matter of contraceptive coverage, and more than the fact that complying
with the regulation costs money, since complying with all regulations cost
money. The majority opinion did address cost, calling compliance with the
regulations "costly," with "severe" economic consequences, and calling it "far
from clear" that a company might actually save money by paying the
penalty under the statute and dropping coverage. 255 To be sure, the statute
250 Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Until this litigation, no decision of this Court
recognized a for-profit corporation's qualification for a religious exemption from a generally
applicable law, whether under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA .... [T]he exercise of religion is
characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal entities.").
251 Id. at 2785 (majority opinion) ("Our decision on that statutory question makes it unneces-
sary to reach the First Amendment claim .... ").
252 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 75-79, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354).
253 See supra notes 242, 244, 247 and accompanying text.
254 John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1229 (1993).
255 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775, 2777.
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does regulate insurance coverage by corporations. But again, that compli-
ance with a statute or regulation costs money does not give rise to a claim,
unless there is a separate constitutional or statutory deficiency with the
statute or regulation. In Hobby Lobby, the corporations would have to show
some "injury" to their religious exercise. How could they do so, except by
invoking the beliefs and rights of the separate owners of the corporation?
The dissent argued, citing to Justice Stevens's opinion in Citizens United,
that corporations literally "have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no
thoughts, no desires. '25 6 Justice Ginsburg argued: "the exercise of religion is
characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal entities."2 7 Furthermore,
the majority in Hobby Lobby addressed the separate claims brought by the
individual owners themselves;2 5 8 the notion that the owners could sue on
behalf of legally separate corporations would raise still more problematic
issues of third-party standing.
2. Hobby Lobby's Implications for Corporate Standing
Without actually addressing Article III standing, Justice Alito did sug-
gest that the corporations themselves could possess "religious beliefs" that
would be harmed by regulations that "in effect tell the plaintiffs that their
beliefs are flawed."25 9 Throughout the majority opinion, Justice Alito
emphasized that both the owners "and their companies sincerely believe"
that providing contraceptive coverage violates "their religious beliefs." 260 On
the thinnest ground of all, Justice Alito cited to the 1961 Braunfeld v. Brown
decision as an example of the Court's supposed recognition that "a sole
proprietorship that seeks to make a profit may assert a free exercise
claim. '261 That was the only effort to suggest that the Court had found
standing to assert free exercise claims by a for-profit. Braunfeld involved five
merchants, all sole proprietors, challenging a Sunday business closing law. 262
A sole proprietorship is nothing like a corporation; it is unincorporated, run
by a single person, and is not in any way separate from that single owner.263
256 Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
257 Id.
258 Id. at 2764-6S (majority opinion).
259 Id. at 2778.
260 Id. at 2779.
261 Id. at 2770.
262 Id. at 2767.
263 See, e.g., Sole Proprietorship, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.sba.gov/content/sole-proprietorship-o (last visited Dec. 15, 204), archived at
http://perma.cc/ 9 EH2-BY6E.
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Moreover, Braunfeld never discussed the fact that any of the merchants were
sole proprietors and neither did another 1961 case cited by the majority,
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc.2 64 In that case,
which included a corporation and five individual challengers, 265 the Court
had no reason to discuss standing. The decision pre-dated modern Article
III standing jurisprudence, and, in contrast to the misleading way that
Justice Alito quoted from the case, the Court in Braunfeld had dismissed the
free exercise claims of the merchants finding insufficient injury where the
law only made business "more expensive" for them.266 The Court in Gal-
lagher simply relied on the reasoning in Braunfeld without addressing
standing.267
The Hobby Lobby majority suggested that corporations can exercise reli-
gion on behalf of their owners, or as a pass-through for the rights of the
owners. Justice Alito emphasized that the purpose of a corporation "is to
provide protection for human beings," adding that "[a] corporation is simply
a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends."
268
Justice Alito's discussion of corporate constitutional rights is particularly
troubling for its potential implications in cases in which a court reaches the
substance of a constitutional claim. The reasoning suggests that a corpora-
tion may claim a constitutional right so long as individuals might indirectly
benefit from the litigation, regardless of whether there is any direct injury
to the corporate litigant itself.269 Such an approach ignores the corporate
form and would undo Article III standing (and in the process, call into
question the occasions in which the Court has denied standing to, for
example, nonprofit organizations).
Justice Alito then noted that Fourth Amendment protection of corpora-
tions can also protect privacy interests of employees. 270 That much is
partially accurate; in fact, the Supreme Court has long ruled that under the
Fourth Amendment "neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations
can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret." 271 Justice
Alito then cited to the Takings Clause, stating that protecting corporations
264 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
265 Id. at 618.
266 366 U.S. 599, 6o5 (1961).
267 Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 631 ("Since the decision in that case rejects the contentions pre-
sented by these appellees on the merits, we need not decide whether appellees have standing to
raise these questions.").
268 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
269 See, e.g., id. ("When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corpora-
tions, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.").
270 See id.
271 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
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from "seizure of their property without just compensation" also protects the
financial stake of the owners.2 72 To be sure, as described in Part I, the
Supreme Court has found that a wide range of constitutional rights apply to
corporations, including rights that might typically be litigated by individuals.
The real leap in Hobby Lobby occurred where Justice Alito concluded
that protecting free exercise rights of corporations also protects "the
religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.
273
That reasoning conflates associational and organizational standing, and it
assumes that corporations and individuals can have common "beliefs" just as
they can have common privacy or financial interests. A corporation itself is
injured if its premises are searched as part of a civil or criminal investigation
targeting the corporation itself or if its property is taken without compensa-
tion. A separate corporation lacks the relevant free exercise injury, since it
lacks "religious liberty" as a for-profit corporation; Justice Alito would have
had to do hard work to justify such a claim, beyond citing to views of the
owners. In contrast, a nonprofit religious organization, functioning in effect
as an association, exists to permit religious exercise of members2 74: as the
Court puts it, "[flor many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in
large measure from participation in a larger religious community. ' 275 For the
Court to suggest that a for-profit company is no different than a non-profit
or an association or a religious entity, and that these distinctions are "quite
beside the point,' 276 ignores the relevance of the corporate form entirely.
In the process of making these unfounded claims, the Supreme Court
suggested that the corporate form itself is irrelevant to the question of
Article III standing, calling into question each of the entrenched distinc-
tions in the case law between associational and organizational standing.
Moreover, the Court disregarded the fundamental feature of state corporate
law: separation of ownership from the entity. The corporation is legally
separate from owners, officers, employees, shareholders, or other constituents;
the corporation does not litigate on behalf of its owners' personal interests,
but rather out of a duty to maximize corporate profits, returns to owners or
272 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
273 Id.
274 See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L.
REV. 917, 957 (2013) (arguing that churches should be treated as voluntary associations rather than
corporations for purposes of standing).
275 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
276 Hobby Lobby, 132 S. Ct. at 2768.
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shareholders generally, or other corporate goals. 27  To be sure, at times the
Court suggested that its holding was limited to for-profit and closely held
corporations, taking pains to emphasize that for-profit companies may
pursue "worthy objectives" like charitable causes or the public interest, in
addition to profit-seeking. 278 The Court suggested that any contrary argu-
ment "flies in the face of modern corporate law. '279
q However, nothing could be more fundamental to modern corporate law
than the complete separation of the owners from the legal entity itself. As
the Supreme Court put it inJJ McCaskill Co. v. United States, "[u]ndoubtedly
a corporation is, in law, a person or entity entirely distinct from its stock-
holders and officers. ' 280 Similarly, as the Court stated in Cedric Kushner
Promotions, Ltd. v. King, "incorporation's basic purpose is to create a distinct
legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different
from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it
employs. '281 Contrary to the majority's statement in Hobby Lobby, there is a
"sharp line" between nonprofits, religious organizations, and for-profits, and
the Court attempted to blur that line in ways that have very troubling
implications for corporate law generally. 282 Far from being "quite beside the
point," legal separateness is the point of creating a corporation.
To be sure, the Supreme Court could have made far better supported
arguments, limiting the reasoning perhaps to family-owned closely held
corporations. Several lower courts did so, addressing the standing question
in careful detail; 283 as discussed, however, that reasoning would likely have
to rely on a notion of prudential third-party standing, which itself poses real
problems given the potentially conflicting interests of third parties to the
litigation. The Court should have engaged in the required Article III
analysis as the lower courts had more conscientiously done, perhaps avoiding
unnecessary language suggestive of standing for corporations generally.
A brief analogy to representation in aggregate litigation may also be
helpful. A showing limited to a financial interest in the litigation would not
be sufficient to establish standing under the class action rules because a
277 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE § 2.o1(a) (1994)
(describing how "a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a
view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain" (citation omitted)).
278 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770-71.
279 Id. at 2770.
280 216 U.S. 504, 514 (1910).
281 S33 U.S. 158, 163 (2001).
282 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
283 See generally Beckwith Elec. Co. v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 3284604, at *4-11 (M.D. Fla. June
25, 2013); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d io6, 115-19 (D.D.C. 2012).
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court would be obligated to scrutinize adequacy of representation by the
representative litigants based on due process concerns. 214 Class actions raise
different issues than organizational litigation, and to be sure, state corpora-
tion law separately defines and protects the interests of owners and share-
holders in an organization. Whether an organization or association should
add something to the question of standing, as the Court has often held, is
very difficult to square with the treatment of class actions by individuals,
which in contrast, the Court has suggested adds nothing to the question of
standing.285 Perhaps the Court should revisit organizational standing
jurisprudence to ensure that there is in fact adequacy of representation
comporting with Article III and due process requirements. Such due
process principles concerning exercise of organizational rights in conflict
with, or even at the expense of, an individual's day in court still operate
tacitly, even if not fully developed in the doctrine. In certain situations in
which the underlying constitutional right creates tension between an
association or organization and individuals, the Supreme Court has been
unwilling to permit litigation by the organization. Prudential standing
concerns, as well as concerns regarding the due process rights of individual
litigants, may also explain why the Court should be unwilling to so broadly
recognize constitutional rights of organizations in the additional contexts to
which I turn next.
C. Third-Party Standing
Some rights may not be asserted by an organization, and the Supreme
Court's prudential or non-Article III third-party standing doctrine helps to
explain why. The Court has articulated its test as follows: "Ordinarily, one
may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the constitutional rights
of some third party,"286 but a third party has standing when there is (i) some
injury to the party litigating the right, (2) a close relationship to the
284 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4). If individual people joined together to seek damages, they
must show that common issues of law and fact predominate, among other requirements in Rule 23.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (b)(3). In contrast, such a showing is not required in a suit seeking to enjoin
an unconstitutional government action or policy. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (b)(2). In damages actions,
as the Advisory Committee noted when the modern federal class action rule was adopted in 1966,
"[i]t is only where this predominance exists that economies can be achieved by means of the class-
action device." FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (b)( 3 ) advisory committee's note to the 1966 amendments.
285 See Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, supra note 33, at 637 ("There is a great
deal of tension between the Court's treatment of associations and with class actions."). In cases
requesting equitable remedies, the Court has often insisted that a class action "adds nothing to the
question of standing." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)).
286 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
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nonparty whose rights are directly being litigated, and (3) some obstacle to
that nonparty litigating, such that fundamental rights might otherwise go
unprotected. 287
The Supreme Court has permitted parties to assert the rights of third
parties with whom they have a close relationship, including permitting
doctors to sue to assert constitutional rights of patients and vendors the
rights of customers. 288 In such cases, the litigants first had to show sufficient
injury in fact to themselves, that is, a claim that their own constitutional
rights were impaired. Those were not typically cases involving organizations
(although one example, Craig v. Boren, is a case involving a bar owner's
equal protection challenge to a liquor law28 9 ). One might expect a court to
rule that because individuals who suffer the injury directly can sue, there is
no need to permit a third-party organization to sue unless it is an associa-
tion, or unless there is some special justification for permitting third-party
standing. Examples include the special nature of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, an advocacy relationship combined with a strong assurance that
the third party is "fully, or very nearly" as effective an advocate for the
constitutional right, or some reason why a claim by the individual party
would evade review.290 One can imagine that an owner of a closely held
corporation might be an effective advocate for the corporation itself, but
what about the health benefits of the employees and their dependents?
A mere economic effect of a regulation on the corporation should not
permit the corporation to assert the constitutional rights of third parties
287 See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.9.3 (3d ed. 2oo8) ("[lIt is increasingly common to
state that third-party standing requires three elements: an injury in fact to a party, a close
relationship to the nonparty whose rights are asserted, and some significant obstacle that impedes
the nonparty's assertion of his own rights."); see also Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 397-400
(1998) (permitting third-party standing where the three preconditions had been satisfied).
288 See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433 (1998) (granting standing to daughter to
pursue father's gender discrimination claim); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (allowing
vendor to bring action to protect rights of vendee); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. so6, 117 (1976)
(allowing physician to litigate on behalf of patient for right to abortion).
289 Craig v. Boren involved a business owner of a bar protesting unequal treatment of 18-20
year-old males under an Oklahoma liquor law. 429 U.S. at 192. The appellant Craig turned 21
before the case reached the Court; it was a case that might otherwise evade review. Id. The Court
noted that the statute was directed toward compliance by such vendors, but more importantly, that
the vendor would be an effective "advocate[]" for the separate interests of the third parties. Id. at
195-97.
290 See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972) ("[Tlhe rela-
tionship between Baird and those whose rights he seeks to assert is not simply that between a
distributor and potential distributees, but that between an advocate of the rights of persons to
obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so.").
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absent a strong showing that the harm affected the close relationship.291
Moreover, not only must there be a showing that there is no conflict
between the interests of, say, the seller and buyer,292 but there must be a
showing that the third prong of the prudential standing test is met: that the
third party faces some obstacle to litigating the rights on his own. 293
The prudential standing test is discretionary and is not a model of clarity,
but its application is dependent on the suitability of the particular constitu-
tional rights for assertion by others. As to the second prong of the test,
corporations are not likely to be effective advocates of a range of constitu-
tional rights in which they cannot share an interest. As the Supreme Court
noted in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, "[c]ertain 'purely personal'
guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are
unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the 'historic
function' of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of
individuals. '294 What explains the characterization of certain rights, such as
self-incrimination liberty rights, citizenship rights, and Privileges and
Immunities Clause rights as "purely personal?" The organization may not
itself have standing to assert a harm if, for example, harm suffered by
employees or other constituents typically cannot be delegated to the legal
entity based on underlying substantive law. Some rights are not delegable to
organizations or to other individuals. Property is delegable. Voting rights
are not delegable to third parties. Jury service is not delegable. Marriage
rights are not delegable. The Court, as discussed, has held Fifth Amend-
ment self-incrimination rights are not delegable. If the Court recognized
Fifth Amendment rights of corporations, the corporation still would not be
able to assert the Fifth Amendment rights of an individual employee, who
after all, could be separately prosecuted, and unlike the corporation, could
be sentenced to a prison term. Not only is a corporation legally separate,
but courts should not recognize third-party standing if doing so would
undermine rights of individuals.
291 This is where I part company with the general claim that any economic injury to a corpo-
rate plaintiff provides Article III standing, briefly made in Hall & Means, supra note 29, at 154.
Their focus, however, is the more limited claim that the owners of a "family-owned business" have
special status and ability to litigate on behalf of the corporation. Id. That argument also hinges on
whether there are in fact "significant obstacles" to others separately litigating any violations of
their own constitutional rights. Id. at 157-59.
292 For examples, see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 287, at § 3531.9.3 nn.46-57.
293 See id. § 3531.9.3 (noting that "[a] party may be denied the opportunity to advance another's
interests when courts doubt the quality of the relationship, fear the party's interests may diverge
from the nonparty's interests, suspect the party may be seeking general public-interest standing, or
believe that specific rights are not suited to third-party standing").
294 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.54 (1978).
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The Hobby Lobby decision raises troubling questions concerning the
prudential doctrine of third-party standing. The Supreme Court, unlike
many of the lower courts, failed to engage in any third-party standing
analysis, treating the separate owners and the corporations as joined at the
hip. However, the corporations were, on one theory, asserting the free
exercise interests of third parties: the owners of a for-profit corporation. To
properly address the question, the Court had to do more than show some
injury to the party litigating the right; the Court also had to show (2) a
close relationship to the nonparty, and (3) some obstacle to that party
litigating such that the rights might otherwise go unprotected.
Perhaps only a closely held family-owned corporation could show such a
close relationship; that would be the narrower reading of Hobby Lobby, and
that was how some lower courts approached the question. 29 As the Court
put it in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, "much more is needed" to show
standing if the particular injury asserted by a plaintiff affects "someone
else."296 This is so where the injury can "hinge on the response of the
regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction-
and perhaps on the response of others as well. '297 In Lujan, the "special
interest" of the members of the organization was not sufficiently "directly"
or "imminent[ly]" affected by the action of the federal agency.298 And yet in
Hobby Lobby, there was no organization with members, but rather it was the
religious beliefs of the separate owners that gave rise to the claim. The
Court did not discuss third-party standing or reach the question whether
the owners could bring separate claims. If the owners could not separately
sue, perhaps due to a lack of the requisite injury in fact, then there would be
a stronger argument for prudential third-party standing.2 99 However, there
were separate interests requiring consideration: those of nonparty employees
and their dependents.
The interests of nonparty employees raise particularly troubling ques-
tions in the Hobby Lobby case. As Justice Ginsburg forcefully emphasized in
the dissent, free exercise jurisprudence recognizes that accommodations to
religious beliefs "must not significantly impinge on the interests of third
295 See, e.g., Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 1o6, 118 (D.D.C.
2012) ("Tyndale and the Foundation are closely-linked entities that share common religious
objections.
296 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
297 Id.
298 Id. at 563-64.
299 See Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 119 ("The third-party standing doctrine serves to avoid
such conundrums.").
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parties."300 The employers could "deny legions of women who do not hold
their employers' beliefs access to contraceptive coverage that the ACA
would otherwise secure," as well as harming the interests of the dependents
of employees.3 1 Moreover, only the independent decision by employees to
seek out coverage implicates the supposed harm to religious beliefs; all that
the employer is obligated to do is pay money into an undifferentiated
fund.30 2 Conflicts of interest are inherent in recognizing free exercise rights
of for-profit companies, Justice Ginsburg suggested, when those companies
cannot by law discriminate in hiring based on religion.30 3 In contrast,
religious organizations "exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to
the same religious faith."30 4 Somehow that fundamental distinction simply
"escapes the Court's attention. 305
The Hobby Lobby ruling also runs counter to the Supreme Court's own
prior statements regarding third-party suits by shareholders, although to be
sure, the Court in Hobby Lobby delicately avoided the topic of public
companies (calling free exercise litigation by "corporate giants" an "unlikely"
event306), as well as the question whether the owners of the closely held
corporations in the case could separately sue. State incorporation law
protects rights of individuals with a stake in a corporation by permitting
shareholders standing to litigate injuries to the corporation in derivative
lawsuits, brought not on their own behalf, but on behalf of the corpora-
tion.30 7 In federal court, such actions are regulated to ensure the plaintiff
really was a shareholder at the relevant time, to ensure fair and adequate
representation of other shareholders, and other requirements imposed by
Rule 23.1.308 The Supreme Court considered such rules for shareholder suits
in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., suggesting
without reaching the question that even if there is Article III standing, the
"prudential requirements of the standing doctrine" might counsel against
permitting standing by a corporation's owners, if under state law those
shareholders may not pursue an action where the management have de-
clined to do so in exercise of good-faith business judgment.30 9
300 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2790 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
301 Id.
302 Id. at 2799.
303 Id. at 2795-96.
304 Id. at 2795.
305 Id. at 2796.
306 Id. at 2774 (majority opinion).
307 For a digest of state law on the subject, see 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 484 (2013).
308 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (describing prerequisites to filing a derivative action in federal court).
309 493 U.S. 331, 336-38 (199o).
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Shareholders are considered separate and unable to generally sue for
injuries to the company; corporations cannot litigate the separate interests
of shareholders and associations can only litigate the interests of members.
For constitutional rights, when would delegation undermine the adequacy of
an organization's representation or conflict with the interests of the individuals
for whom a right is primarily designed to protect or raise still additional
prudential standing concerns? Consider the Fifth Amendment, defined by
the Court as a person-specific privilege against self-incrimination. As
described, the Court held in Hale v. Henkel that the Fifth Amendment
cannot be asserted by an organization on behalf of individuals.310 Indeed,
assertion of such a privilege by the organization might conflict with the
rights of an individual facing prosecution. However, as noted, denying a
corporate representative the right to assert the Fifth Amendment can take
the rule so far so as to harm individual rights.
In a class action, such a conflict might make the representation inade-
quate. The Supreme Court has been extremely vigilant in policing due
process concerns in class action litigation, as well as compliance with the
commands of Rule 23. Indeed many commentators argue that the Court has
gone too far in unduly hampering effective class action litigation, with
particular criticism directed toward the Court's 2ol ruling in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).311 In associational standing cases,
however, as discussed, the Supreme Court has noted that a representative
suit does not bind nonmembers, and if there was a lack of adequacy of
representation, the ruling might not preclude subsequent suits by members
of the association for due process reasons. 312 Similar due process concerns
310 201 U.S. 43, 70 (i9o6).
311 See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 776 (2013)
(arguing that the decision in Wal-Mart "cannot be squared with the text, structure, or history of
Rule 23(a)(2)"); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v.
Wal-Mart, so6 NW. U. L. REV. 34, 45 (2o11) (stating that Wal-Mart "reversed almost a half-
century of Title VII jurisprudence"); Erwin Chemerinsky, New Limits on Class Actions, TRIAL,
Nov. 2011, at 54 (noting that "Wal-Mart has significant implications for all class action litigation in
federal court"); David G. Savage, Supreme Court Blocks Huge Class-Action Suit Against Wal-Mart,
L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2011 (quoting law professor John Coffee's comment that "it largely eliminates
the monetary threat facing big employers").
312 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569 (1992) (noting that the nonparty
agencies could not be bound by the decision in the suit); see also United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 556 n.6 (1996) ("The germaneness of a
suit to an association's purpose may, of course, satisfy a standing requirement without necessarily
rendering the association's representation adequate to justify giving the association's suit preclusive
effect as against an individual ostensibly represented."); Donald F. Simone, Note, Associational
Standing and Due Process: The Need for an Adequate Representation Scrutiny, 61 B.U. L. REV. 174, 181
(1981) ("Due process mandates that in an associational suit an individual member must either be
adequately represented or be permitted to relitigate his claim in a subsequent suit.").
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animate the class action certification requirements under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 313
For still additional constitutional rights, the injury to the corporation is
not concrete under existing constitutional law. Thus, it would take an
additional development in the underlying doctrine to clarify what would
constitute a sufficient injury and why a corporation would have standing. In
such cases, the question of standing does not simplify the inquiry because
the constitutional right is unclear or requires development. For example,
Darrell Miller has argued that corporations might have Second Amendment
rights to bear arms after Citizens United.3 14 It is unclear why or what corpo-
rate interest would be harmed by a gun regulation. An individual person,
such as an employee of a corporation, could bring a challenge under the
Second Amendment to a firearms regulation, and perhaps an association
could do the same on behalf of members. What corporate injury could exist
is less clear, unless it was a firearms regulation that economically impacted
the corporation-for example, a limit on the types of firearms that can be
carried by a licensed private security firm or armored transport company.315
D. Consequentialism and Not Reciprocity
In corporate constitutional litigation, the Supreme Court has cited a
reciprocity element to the analysis, drawing from the tradition of treating
corporations as conditioned in their existence on the state: "businessmen
engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the
313 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 864 (1999) (finding error where nonparties were not adequately represented); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997) (holding that class action settlements must
provide "structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and
individuals affected"); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940)) (recognizing an exception to promissory estoppel where the nonparty's
interests are "adequately represented" by a party); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 366 ("[A]dequate representation is a
prerequisite for binding individuals to the outcome of a case .... ); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, S8 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 84-96 (1991) (discussing the
contours of the adequacy requirement to ensure proper due process protections); Jack B.
Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 481 (1994) (comparing
the obligations to claimants, defendants, and the public in class actions and mass tort litigation).
314 See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887 (2011) (analyzing the extent of corporate
Second Amendment rights under a range of different analytical perspectives).
315 See id. at 942-43 (discussing various situations in which a corporation might have an
interest in, and the potential to challenge, certain gun regulations).
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burdens as well as the benefits of their trade."3 16 In United States v. Morton
Salt Co., the Court similarly noted that corporations "have a collective
impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as
artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with
them an enhanced measure of regulation."3 17 Some scholars have viewed this
as a matter of reciprocity, in the "grant" tradition. As Professor Andrew
Taslitz has put it: "As long as corporations are treated like persons, corpora-
tions must endure ... the same duties and penalties-including criminal
punishment-that the rest of us do.13
1 1
I view such language slightly differently, not as about an implied condition
of reciprocity, in the sense that corporations owe the state their existence
and have privileges conditioned on legal behavior, but rather that litigation
by and against organizations accomplishes consequentialist ends. Some have
criticized such a view of reciprocity as suggesting unconstitutional condi-
tions on constitutional rights, including Justice Scalia in Citizens United. I
view the problem in light of the rationale for corporate constitutional
standing, which exists in the first place because corporations may litigate
regulations that apply to them, and then they may or may not be able to
assert a constitutional defense to the regulation. In constitutional cases, a
corporation does not represent the constitutional rights of individuals; only
an association, or perhaps a nonprofit or religious organization serving a
similar role, may do so. Similarly in criminal cases, corporate criminal
liability is intended to hold corporations accountable, in order to make
criminal laws effective in their enforcement, and concerns of the effective-
ness animate the interpretation of underlying constitutional criminal
procedure rights.
The Supreme Court's ruling that corporations may be criminally prose-
cuted in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States
emphasized that the acts of an employee should be imputed to the corpora-
tion for entirely consequentialist reasons.3 19 New York Central buttresses a
consequentialist account of organizational standing. There, the railroad's
managers had offered rebates to sugar refining companies on railroad freight
rates, in violation of the Elkins Act, which prohibited such special treatment
in railroad rates. 320 The Act included a provision creating liability for a
316 Almeida-Sanchez v."United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).
317 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
318 Andrew E. Taslitz, Reciprocity and the Criminal Responsibility of Corporations, 41 STETSON
L. REV. 73, 95 (2o11).
319 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (199o).
320 Id. at 489.
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corporation under a respondeat superior standard adopted from tort law, in
which the entity's liability is derivative of the crime of an employee.3 2 1 In
other words, the corporation was strictly liable for a crime by an employee
acting within the scope of employment.
The Supreme Court upheld the statute, citing to "the interest of public
policy. '3 22 Corporate criminal liability makes regulation more effective.
Quoting a criminal law treatise, the Court said: "If, for example, the invisible,
intangible essence of air, which we term a corporation, can level mountains,
fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them, it can
intend to do it, and can act therein as well viciously as virtuously. 3 23
The Court explained there might be some crimes that cannot be com-
mitted by corporations, but a range of statutory regulatory offenses can
readily be applied to corporations to make the regulation more effective:
It is a part of the public history of the times that statutes against rebates
could not be effectually enforced so long as individuals only were subject to
punishment for violation of the law, when the giving of rebates or concessions
enured to the benefit of the corporations of which the individuals were but
the instruments. This situation, developed in more than one report of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, was no doubt influential in bringing
about the enactment of the Elkins Law, making corporations criminally
liable.
324
The Court concluded in still stronger language that to give corporations
"immunity" from responsibility for crimes "because of the old and exploded
doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take
away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and
correcting the abuses aimed at."325 Thus, the Court approved as constitu-
tional a statute holding a corporation separately criminally liable, but
derivatively, for the acts of officers or employees in the scope of their duties.
That respondeat superior standard now applies in federal criminal cases.
In both civil rights and criminal cases, a corporation can provide a con-
venient litigation unit. For an example, take the 191o caseJ. j. McCaskill Co.
v. United States, in which the Supreme Court dealt with the status of
corporations as property holders in a dispute about a federal land patent
deeded to a homesteader, acting as a corporate agent, who conveyed the
321 Id. at 491.
322 Id. at 494.
323 Id. at 493.
324 Id. at 495.
325 Id. at 496.
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land to the corporation. 326 The Court cited to corporate law principles and
noted "[a] growing tendency is therefore exhibited in the courts to look
beyond the corporate form to the purpose of it and to the officers who are
identified with that purpose. '327 While acts and knowledge of employees
may not always be attributed to the corporation, this agent was not an
"innocent purchaser," and criminal law need not "enable the corporation to
become a means of fraud or a means to evade its responsibilities."
328
The Supreme Court relied on the respondeat superior rule that a corpo-
ration is bound by acts of its agents. There is no converse relationship; the
corporation cannot vindicate rights on behalf of individuals. Constitutional
criminal procedure in particular sheds light on something else about the
constitutional status of corporations: permitting corporations to assert
constitutional rights does not necessarily insulate them from government
power but can flow from how they may be the direct targets of civil and
criminal enforcement. Thus, during criminal trials, in which corporations
and employees may be jointly prosecuted, extending constitutional rights to
corporations permits them to present a separate defense. In that defensive
context, extending constitutional rights to corporations may not only
protect the fairness of adversary proceedings, but also can enable corpora-
tions to trade on their rights to obtain leniency with prosecutors by cooperating
to ensure that individual wrongdoers are punished.329
IV. THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
This Part turns to the areas in which constitutional rights of corpora-
tions could be reconsidered, as well as the need to examine more carefully
the adequacy of organizational standing to assert constitutional rights on
behalf of others. Finally, I conclude by discussing an extremely broad
question: the possible impact of the Supreme Court's evolving approach
toward corporate constitutional standing on constitutional litigation gener-
ally and on the substance of constitutional rights.
326 216 U.S. 504, 505 (1910).
327 Id. at 515.
328 Id. at 514-15.
329 For a detailed treatment of corporate criminal litigation, prosecution practices, and possible
conflicts with employees during such litigation, as well as evidence concerning how often
prosecutors successfully rely on corporate cooperation in order to prosecute employees and
officers, see generally GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 175.
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A. Reconsidering Constitutional Non-Protection of Corporations
I argue that in several of its rulings on the constitutional rights of corpo-
rations, the Supreme Court has it wrong. Each area is far less prominent
than Citizens United or Hobby Lobby. In that context, I have argued that a
for-profit corporation cannot assert derivatively the free exercise or con-
science rights of owners, particularly given conflicts with rights of employees.
The separate cost of complying with the regulation is not the constitutional
injury that the First Amendment protects, and regardless, neither corpora-
tions nor associations can litigate the rights of constituent owners or
employees, although an association or religious organization can litigate on
behalf of members.
In addition, I argue the Supreme Court should reconsider its Fifth
Amendment "collective entity" decisions. The lack of a corporate Fifth
Amendment right can directly impact the rights of individual employees.
The Court reasoned in Braswell v. United States that as corporate officers
serving in that capacity, an employee cannot assert Fifth Amendment
privilege on behalf of the corporation, even in the situation in which
complying might be incriminating. °3 0 Justice Kennedy dissented in Braswell,
citing the concern that individuals can be personally incriminated for
refusing to comply with corporate subpoenas.3 31 However, even in that
dissent, Justice Kennedy affirmed the general principle that corporations
lack Fifth Amendment rights, noting:
Our long course of decisions concerning artificial entities and the
Fifth Amendment served us well. It illuminated two of the critical
foundations for the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination: first, that it is an explicit right of a natural person,
protecting the realm of human thought and expression; second, that
it is confined to governmental compulsion.3 32
The general principle may not be as important as the Braswell Court
suggested. Suppose the Supreme Court reversed Hale v. Henkel. Matters
would not change dramatically since, as noted, the Court has held that
business records themselves are not testimonial, and thus there could be no
330 487 U.S. 99, 11o (1988).
331 See id. at 128 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Scott D. Price, Note, Braswell v. United
States: An Examination of a Custodian's Fifth Amendment Right to Avoid Personal Production of
Corporate Records, 34 VILL. L. REV. 353, 379-80 (1989) (detailing the concerns with subpoenas of
businesses implicating personal Fifth Amendment rights discussed in Justice Kennedy's dissent in
Braswell).
332 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Fifth Amendment objection to the demand for their production by a
corporation . 3 3  Neither individuals nor the corporation could object to the
production of business records unless the person being asked to produce the
records could self-incriminate through the act of production. By designating
another officer to produce the records, there could be no legitimate objec-
tion to a subpoena request.
In a far more obscure area, some courts hold corporations lack Sixth
Amendment rights to have an adequate defense lawyer represent them in a
criminal matter. Circuits are split on whether corporations have a right to
adequate defense counsel, which individuals undoubtedly retain.33 4 I see it
as a straightforward question, with a different answer. Because corporations
may be separately prosecuted for crimes of employees, they are entitled to
have counsel represent them when they stand in for aggregate interests not
adequately represented by those of employee-defendants and that may
outright conflict with employees charged with crimes (and after all, organi-
zations cannot represent themselves pro se). Organizations should therefore
be entitled to the basic assurances of a fair trial, including the Sixth
Amendment right to adequate representation by defense counsel.
B. Organizational Rights Taxonomies
The most prominent alternative approach to theorizing more broadly
about the constitutional rights of corporations is Professor Meir Dan-Cohen's
approach, which resembles in its general outlines that of the Supreme Court
in its pre-Citizens United corporate speech cases.33 5 Dan-Cohen created a
rich and detailed taxonomy of types of organizations that indicates whether
a particular organization is of the type that should enjoy a particular consti-
tutional protection. 3 6 While an admirable and useful approach, I have
argued it is unnecessarily complex from the perspective of the existing tests
for organizational and associational standing. That said, the distinctions that
333 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
334 Compare United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Phila., Inc., 612 F.2d 74o , 743 (3d Cir. 1979)
("[A]n accused has no less of a need for effective assistance due to the fact that it is a corpora-
tion."), and Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873 n.i4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It
appears beyond sensible debate that corporations, in our society, do indeed enjoy the right to
retain counsel."), with United States v. Unimex, Inc., 991 F.2d 546, 550 (9 th Cir. 1993) ("Being
incorporeal, corporations cannot be imprisoned, so they have no constitutional right to appointed
counsel."), and United States v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343, 350 (4 th Cir. 1997) (finding "no suggestion"
that corporations are entitled to publicly appointed counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3 oo6A).
335 See generally MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL
THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986).
336 See generally id.
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Dan-Cohen explores do matter, and they help to explain why organizational
standing is different as between corporations and associations; standing is
neither unrestricted nor entirely indifferent to the type of organization and
the type of constitutional injury litigated. In any number of cases, an
association may diverge from the interests of members, whether due to the
particular constitutional right being litigated or the posture of the litigation.
As discussed, for-profit corporations typically lack standing to litigate on
behalf of individuals (and if one did so in a case involving money damages,
individuals might not be bound by the result).
Due to the manner in which the Supreme Court defined the underlying
substance of the speech right in Citizens United, the type and form of the
organization did not affect the standing analysis. A for-profit corporation,
unlike the nonprofit at issue in Citizens United, would not typically represent
effectively or adequately the interests of individuals for whom the constitu-
tional right is intended to protect. James Nelson has forcefully and convinc-
ingly argued, for example, that for-profit entities should not have standing
to litigate First Amendment right of conscience claims, but the Court did
not, unfortunately, carefully engage with his argument in the Hobby Lobby
ruling.337 Corporations lack the ability to assert liberty rights under the Due
Process Clauses, for reasons that can be articulated in standing terms, and
prior to Hobby Lobby, one would have supposed religious liberty was
something "personal" for which business corporations, at least, would not be
adequate representatives for purposes of litigation, while nonprofits and
associations should be treated differently under standing law, as I have
described.
What the Supreme Court has not carefully defined in associational
standing case law is what threshold of adequacy permits the association to
assert an injury on behalf of its constituents, members, or other individuals.
While Rule 23 standards for civil class action litigation are not adapted to
those ends, they provide an area in which the Court has engaged (and
controversially so) with questions concerning adequacy of representation of
a group of individuals in litigation. The Court has not done the same in
associational standing cases, except to note that adequacy concerns and
prudential concerns exist, and by implication, to decline to recognize
337 See James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 16o9-1o (arguing
that for-profit corporations are usually not connected to individual members and so should not be
able to assert free exercise claims). Nelson also provides an excellent discussion of treatment of
close corporations, noting that the shareholder wealth maximization norm or fiduciary duty norms
apply to close corporations as well. See id. at 1591-95 (arguing that close corporations also foster
detachment because they are bound by fiduciary duty norms).
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standing of organizations to litigate certain constitutional rights.3 38 In
addition, the Supreme Court has been highly reluctant to examine whether
an association is an adequate proxy for the interests of its members: most
notably in cases involving challenges to political parties and their primaries.
The Court has emphasized deference to political parties in the design of
their voting procedures, 339 although the assumption that political parties are
defined private organizations that deserve such deference, or have "rights"
as part of the electoral process, has been criticized. 34
0
A clearer standard should be developed, focusing on whether the sub-
stantive constitutional right can be adequately and effectively litigated by
the association. If it is a corporation, then its structure permits standing to
litigate concrete interests of the entity to improve its profitability, but not
on behalf of other constituents. If it is an association, then it may litigate on
behalf of injury to members. Individual officers or employees require
separate representation and litigation because their rights are distinct. In
addition, a conflict between rights of individuals should tend to bar associa-
tional standing, and the benefits to the group from organizational litigation
should predominate or outweigh any concerns regarding issues better
litigated individually, just as in class action litigation. Whether added
precision can be supplied to the tests for associational and organizational
standing I leave to future work. Given the manner in which the lower courts
had divided over the questions pre-Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court will
likely have to attend to these important questions in the future.
338 See supra note 312.
339 See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224 (1986) ("The Party's deter-
mination of the boundaries of its own association, and of the structure which best allows it to
pursue its political goals, is protected by the Constitution."); see also Cal. Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 581-82 (2000) (worrying that forcing association with a particular party puts a
"burden on a political party's associational freedom" by changing the party's message); Ethan J.
Leib & Christopher S. Elmendorf, Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and Popular
Democrats Need Parties, loo CALIF. L. REV. 69, 83-91 (2012) (describing the importance of political
parties in shaping governance, elections, and citizenship).
340 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Do the Parties or the People Own the Electoral Process?, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 815, 820-26 (2001) (examining the changes in political parties since the founding of
the country and explaining why the political parties do not need constitutional protections);
Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and
Partisan Competition, sol COLUM. L. REV. 274, 293-94 (2001) (describing the broader problem of
state attempts to legally regulate political parties); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutional-
ization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 1o5-o8 (2004) (disagreeing with the Court's
conclusion that political parties have constitutional rights not to associate because it interferes
with states structuring elections). But see Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political
Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 75o , 794-805 (2001) (explaining the benefits of party autonomy
and arguing that judges should actively protect their rights against intrusion).
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C. Individualized and Group-Based Constitutional Rights
Does theorizing corporate constitutional rights require an account of
group rights? Some argue it is improper to reach decisions about constitu-
tional rights "in terms of the rights of corporate persons. '3 4' I have argued
that the Supreme Court does not do so and need not do so. Organizations
and corporations have standing to assert rights only as a defense to regulation
that affects the economic interests of the entity; by contrast, associations
and nonprofits can represent the rights of members or constituents. The
Court carefully avoids interpreting rights as different based on the artificial
nature of the defendant. That said, one reason that so many constitutional
rights are readily amenable to corporate litigation is in part because so many
constitutional rights are not strictly personal and instead apply generally,
whether conceived as duties of government or privileges against govern-
ment conduct and regulation.3 42 In a sense, no criminal procedure rights are
purely personal since they are defined generally as immunities from certain
government investigation or prosecution conduct. 3
41
Due process and other Bill of Rights protections may safeguard individual
rights, but at a highly general level of abstraction the Court typically
balances the state's interests against fundamental interests of individuals.
Corporations and organizations may be perfectly able to assert those
interests on behalf of the organization's interests, and many regulations
impacting individual rights may also cause injury to organizations, including
business organizations. Ideological organizations may be little different than
ideological individual plaintiffs. 44 Indeed, broader definitions of constitu-
tional rights may create more opportunity for non-business citizens groups
to assert constitutional challenges, and doing so may improve the quality of
constitutional litigation. 45  Highly individualized or context-specific
341 Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1658 (1982).
342 Adam Cox's article nicely makes this point regarding the aggregate character of voting
rights and the temporal dimension of that right. See generally Adam B. Cox, The Temporal
Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361 (2007).
343 Exclusionary remedies, for example, are not personal since they are designed to deter
unconstitutional law enforcement conduct and not improve the accuracy of results in a particular
case. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 41 (2009) (explaining that the primary purpose of
the exclusionary rule is deterrence, even if it leads to the release of guilty defendants in some
cases).
344 See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, i16 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1043 (1968) ("It is almost impossible any longer to contend that a
Hohfeldian plaintiff is a necessary element of a case or controversy.").
345 See Karl S. Coplan, Ideological Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing, and the Peti-
tion Clause, 61 ME. L. REV. 377, 396 (2009) (discussing some of the major strides organizations
have made in civil rights, non-discrimination, and environmental cases); Glenn D. Magpantay,
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constitutional rules may not help many individuals, as I have argued
elsewhere, 346 and tend to frustrate aggregate litigation of constitutional
rights, including by organizations.
On the other hand, those more generalized rights may do a poor job of
protecting individuals from harm, recognizing individual dignity interests,
or remedying the particular circumstances of individual rights violations. 347
There is a real tradeoff between the general and the individual. General
rights may lead to higher quality constitutional litigation, but they may
more poorly capture individual dignitary values. Where recognizing general
rights outright conflicts with individual rights, though, the problem of
corporate constitutional standing becomes particularly acute.
CONCLUSION
Is the problem with recognizing corporate constitutional rights that cor-
porations can abuse their rights to frustrate important regulations or
criminal law enforcement as Professor Peter Henning has forcefully
argued?348 Or is the problem that corporations simply are not appropriate
vehicles for individual rights? I argue corporations are, more often than
appreciated, appropriate constitutional litigators. Whether the substance of
any particular constitutional right should be interpreted in a way that
privileges business organizations is a separate question, which can raise
profound grounds for disagreement. But it is a preliminary question,
separate from the merits, whether an organization has Article III standing
to assert constitutional rights on its own behalf. The standing analysis
provides important tools-distinct from the merits inquiry-to evaluate
whether a corporation, as opposed to an association, can litigate a given
constitutional injury.
Taking account of the doctrine through the lens of Article III, there has
been some rhyme to the Supreme Court's varying reasons for denying or
Associational Rights and Standing: Does Citizens United Require Constitutional Symmetry Between the
First Amendment and Article III?, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 667, 687 (2012) (noting that
Asian Americans have been able to vindicate their voting rights through associational challenges
under the First Amendment).
346 See Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, supra note 33, at 598 ("A litigation sys-
tem that prioritizes the aggregate may better address systemic constitutional violations.").
347 See Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of
a "Pointless Indignity," 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1021-22 (2014) (arguing that the strict legal rules of
the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence do not adequately protect human dignity).
348 See Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent
Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793,
8os (1996) (proposing that a court weigh the effects of "an abuse of power" to then "determine the
degree of protection a corporation merits under the Constitution in a criminal prosecution").
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granting corporate constitutional rights. Far from being ad hoc or formulaic,
I argue that the Court's approach toward recognizing constitutional rights
for corporations and other organizations, including associations, can be
understood to reflect a coherent if not consistent expressed view of when an
organization can exercise constitutional rights on behalf of others-
although, to be sure, I have identified important areas in which prior rulings
should be reconsidered. Most troubling, in its Hobby Lobby ruling, the Court
did not directly address Article III standing and appeared to cast to the side
each of the relevant distinctions in the existing doctrine.
Organizations, including corporations, long have had Article III standing
to challenge government acts harming the entity's interests. In contrast,
associations have long litigated constitutional rights affecting rights of
individual members. Religious organizations have long litigated on behalf of
the beliefs of their members. Courts have recognized how such groups can
bring more resources and better representation to constitutional litigation.
For rights tied to citizenship or purely individual subject matter, or where
organizations' interests are in conflict with or do not adequately represent
individuals, however, an organization should lack standing to litigate.
The substance of a particular constitutional right may benefit some
types of organizations more than others, just as some individuals might be
more affected by an interpretation of constitutional doctrine, given individual
preferences and actions. But constitutional rules of recognition should be
drawn broadly and evenhandedly. One might fully disagree with ways that
the Court interprets the substance of particular constitutional rights after
having decided to give an organization standing to litigate. Still more
controversial aspects of the Court's rulings, such as in Citizens United, have
to do with a business-friendly understanding of the First Amendment
equating money with speech-not with the recognition of corporate consti-
tutional standing. Adopting a consequentialist appreciation that constitu-
tional standing of organizations accomplishes practical goals does not mean
that the substance of constitutional rights should be interpreted solely or
even partially based on consequences. The fact that an organization has
standing to assert a constitutional right does not mean that it will obtain
relief on the merits.
Nor should courts ignore questions of individual rights that flow from
permitting organizational litigation. I have argued that due process and
prudential concerns with organizational and associational standing must be
far more carefully scrutinized-just as the Supreme Court can be zealous in
policing due process in class action litigation. In Hobby Lobby, not only was
Article III standing ignored, all the while equating religious beliefs of
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owners with that of a for-profit corporation, but the effect on third-party
employees and dependents was not carefully considered either. Associations
lay a broader claim to represent the interests of members, but the Court has
been clear that even for such an organization, standing requires more than
just an "interest in a problem."349 Apart from the substance of constitutional
rights, if the goal of permitting corporate constitutional litigation is to make
litigation of the underlying constitutional rights more effective, then
tension between individual and organizational rights, or failure of the
organization to adequately represent its constituents, should be carefully
scrutinized for due process violations or prudential considerations counseling
against standing.
Chief Justice John Marshall called a corporation "an artificial being, in-
visible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."35 0 That is
precisely why judges must carefully examine whether an organization has
Article III standing to litigate constitutional rights. If in the past standing
doctrine has been "one of the most criticized aspects of constitutional law,"
then a selective application of that doctrine raises still more cause for
concern. 35s A central lesson from the jurisprudence of constitutional litiga-
tion by organizations-perhaps sobering to those who value the individual's
day in court-is that constitutional rights may be at their strongest when
non-individualized and readily litigated by groups and not just individuals.
Conversely, the cost of allowing an "artificial being," an organization, to
assert rights at the expense of individuals or without adequately representing
individuals can be too great for a constitutional democracy to permit. As the
Court has stated, the law of standing "is founded in concern about the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."3 5 2
A focus on the constitutional standing of organizations serves to ensure that
artificial entities themselves play a valuable and proper, but limited, role in
our democratic society.
349 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
350 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
351 See i LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 390 (3d ed. 2000).
352 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492-93 (2009) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
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